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This issue features our annual review of the past Term’s decisions of theUnited States Supreme Court. Our regular contributors, Professor Todd Pet-tys, of the University of Iowa College of Law, and Professor Charles Weis-
selberg, of Berkeley Law, review the civil and criminal decisions in separate arti-
cles. Once again, they have concentrated on the issues most of concern to judges
in state courts, which represents the majority of the American Judges Associa-
tion’s membership.
As both professors note, the big decisions this Term came on the civil side, so
we start with Professor Pettys review of those cases—including the striking down
of key parts of the Defense of Marriage Act and the Voting Rights Act. Other civil
cases included ones determining how far a city can go in giving or withholding
land use permits before being required to pay for the property; one limiting the
ability of lawyers to use personal information
from state motor-vehicle databases to solicit
clients; and another ruling (added to three in the
prior Term) reversing a state court that had failed
to enforce arbitration agreements under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act. Professor Pettys also reviews
cases being heard in the October 2013 Term.
On the criminal side, Professor Weisselberg
reviews several significant Fourth Amendment
decisions, including one on obtaining and analyz-
ing an arrested person’s DNA (approved 5-4), one
determining that detailed evidence about the
qualifications of a drug-sniffing dog wasn’t
needed, and one holding that a dog sniff on the
front porch of a home was a search subject to Fourth Amendment safeguards.
Weisselberg also reviews a key Fifth Amendment case involving whether a defen-
dant’s silence may be mentioned if a suspect doesn’t expressly invoke the right to
silence in a non-custodial interview or interrogation (yes, 5-4). Professor Weis-
selberg also reviews cases being heard in the October 2013 Term, and he reviews
some of the caselaw developments that have already taken place interpreting last
Term’s key decisions.
Our third article looks at whether implicit bias affects jury decisions and, if
so, what can be done about it. Researchers Jennifer Elek and Paula Hannaford-
Agor review existing research on the effect of implicit bias on juries; they also
review potential steps that might help to lessen that effect.
Our final article examines an interesting question involving the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, which was updated by the American Bar Association in
2007 to include the term “domestic partner” and to make judges subject to con-
flict-of-interest rules regarding domestic partners to the same extent they were
previously subject to those rules with respect to spouses. Andrew Stankevich
notes that some states have not adopted this provision, perhaps because the state
isn’t friendly to gay and lesbian rights. Stankevich suggests that this is a short-
sighted approach with respect to this specific issue, since the failure to include
domestic partners arguably makes less strict conflict-of-interest rules applicable
to gay and lesbian judges.—Steve Leben
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It is a privilege and honor to begin my term as your presi-dent, especially at a time when AJA is so well respected andhighly regarded as the largest judge-only organization in
North America.
As I write, I have recently returned from the fantastic 53rd
education conference in Hawaii where we were honored by wel-
coming letters from Hawaii Governor Neil Abercrombie,  U.S.
Senator Brian Schatz, and U.S. Representative Colleen
Hanabusa. Hawaii Chief Justice Mark Recktenwald came in per-
son to open the conference. If you missed this uplifting event
and the chance to interact with more than 150 of the best judges
in North America and the stellar faculty of 29 dis-
tinguished experts in their respective fields, take a
moment to go to the “Conference” section of our
website (www.amjudges.org) to explore the edu-
cational materials from the conference. You too
will be proud to say that you are an AJA member!
During the business meetings in Hawaii, the
members of the Executive Committee and the
Board of Governors had a chance to review AJA’s
current statement of purpose, which is “to pro-
mote and improve the effective administration of
justice; to maintain the status and independence
of the judiciary; to provide a forum for the continuing educa-
tion of its members and the general public; and for the
exchange of new ideas among all judges.” 
AJA has been successful because of the strategies it has been
using to advance our registered brands:  Making Better Judges
and the Voice of the Judiciary. There are important roles to be
served by robust, voluntary, nongovernmental organizations—
made up of judges—in the constellation of volunteer organiza-
tions that support and work diligently to achieve the ideal of
having judicial organizations (courts) that are open to all and
efficiently deliver justice that is credibly fair and impartial
based on well-understood principles of the rule of law.
To remain so actively engaged, AJA will need to continue to
attract new members, the life’s blood of volunteer organizations
like AJA;  increase the number of AJA members who work
actively to achieve the mission and goals of AJA; develop a
larger core of AJA members who will take on important leader-
ship functions in the organization; and improve communica-
tion and collaboration with other organizations that have sim-
ilar goals of  improving courts.
As your leadership team begins its year, we will be informed
by recognizing what AJA has been doing well and we will strive
to do even better and with a broader impact in proven activities
like educational programs at conferences; its publications—
Court Review, Benchmark, and our blog; and encouraging and
publishing white papers like the 2007 paper on procedural fair-
ness, the 2010 paper on judicial selection and retention, and
the 2012 paper on judicial decision making (all available on
our website). We will soon unveil and market a new web-based
education product on domestic violence (see the inside back
cover of this issue for more information).  We will use our
voice in collaboration with partners like Justice
at Stake, the American Judicature Society, the
National Center for State Courts, the Conference
of Chief Justices, the Conference of State Court
Administrators, and new groups like the
National Forum on Criminal Justice to promote
the use of evidence-based practices and to make
improvements to the civil and criminal justice
systems.
As we go about achieving our mission, we will
be more mindful of and informed by the  empha-
sis placed on particular issues by the National
Center’s publication, Trends in State Courts, and by the priori-
ties set by the Conference of Chief Justices. Therefore, AJA will
focus on civil and criminal justice reform, access to justice, evi-
dence-based sentencing, other evidence-based court-reengi-
neering initiatives, and advancing the interest in therapeutic
justice.  
We recognize that building a strong constituency for courts
and judges will require more engagement by our individual
members with the communities in which we live and work.
Not only will we encourage our members to be more involved
with educating the public about the value of the work we do in
our democracies to deliver justice to all, we expect to develop
a toolkit to make it easier for judges to engage ethically and
effectively.
I encourage you to become more involved with AJA, your
judges’ organization.  I am confident that by increasing your
level of participation, you will be rewarded by being more
enthusiastic about your work.  I know I have been.
This year’s motto will be: we’re in touch, so you be in touch
with us. I look forward to hearing from you.
President’s Column
WE’RE IN TOUCH, SO YOU BE IN TOUCH
Elliott Zide
Footnotes
1. 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
2. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (stating that the Court will defer to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulations
unless that interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation”) (internal quotation omitted).
3. Justice Breyer recused himself because his brother, U.S. District
Judge Charles Breyer, was sitting by designation on the Ninth Cir-
cuit panel that heard the case below.
4. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339, 1344 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
5. Id. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
7. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (explaining that, when Congress dele-
gates the administration of a federal statute to an agency but does
not clearly indicate its intentions with respect to a particular issue
arising under that statute, a court may not substitute its own
interpretation of the statute for the reasonable interpretation of
the agency itself).
8. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
9. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868.
10. Id. at 1870.
11. Id. at 1870-71.
The Supreme Court’s October 2012 Term likely will beremembered best for the Justices’ landmark ruling inUnited States v. Windsor, striking down Section 3 of the
Defense of Marriage Act, and for the jurisdictional ruling in
Hollingsworth v. Perry that helped to reopen the door for same-
sex marriages in California. Many also will long remember
Shelby County v. Holder, invalidating Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act and thereby freeing a number of states and localities
from the preclearance requirements under which they had
operated for decades. Crowded behind those headline-domi-
nating decisions are a host of other broadly consequential rul-
ings on issues ranging from racial preferences in higher educa-
tion, to ratcheting up the requirements for voter registration,
to seeking standing in federal court on the basis of anticipated
injuries. I briefly review the Court’s most noteworthy civil
decisions here, letting a set of alphabetized headings dictate
the order in which I take them up.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AUER DEFERENCE
The Court’s holding in Decker v. Northwest Environmental
Defense Center1 is not likely to be of much interest outside the
world of environmental-law specialists, but the case served as
a vehicle for three Justices to signal an issue of potentially
enormous significance in the larger world of administrative
law. Decker concerned a dispute about the need for National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits covering
storm water flowing off logging roads into nearby rivers. Cit-
ing Auer v. Robbins,2 the Court deferred to the Environmental
Protection Agency’s interpretation of its own regulations and
held that permits were not required.3 It is the continued via-
bility of Auer deference that three Justices questioned.
The leading skeptic was Justice Scalia, who wrote separately
to declare that “[e]nough is enough” and that the time has
come “for us to presume (to coin a phrase) that an agency says
in a rule what it means, and means in a rule what it says
there.”4 Calling Auer deference “a dangerous permission slip
for the arrogation of power,” Justice Scalia argued that it vio-
lates “a fundamental principle of separation of powers—that
the power to write a law and the power to interpret it cannot
rest in the same hands.”5 Joined by Justice Alito, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote separately to say that it would be inappropriate
to take on the question of Auer deference in this case because
it had not been thoroughly argued by the parties, but that the
issue might indeed merit the Court’s attention in the future.
CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Two months later, in City of Arlington v. FCC,6 Justice Scalia
led a majority of the Court in defending a different species of
interpretive deference, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy and Alito warning in dissent about the dangers of
expanding administrative agencies’ already vast powers. The
issue in City of Arlington was whether the Federal Communi-
cations Commission’s interpretation of its own statutory juris-
diction was entitled to Chevron deference.7 Under federal statu-
tory law, state and local zoning authorities must respond
“within a reasonable period of time” when providers of wire-
less telecommunications seek approval to build the towers and
antennas that their services require.8 After the FCC specified
the number of days within which zoning authorities ordinarily
must respond to siting applications, the City of Arlington,
Texas, and other municipalities sought judicial review, arguing
that the FCC lacked the authority to say what Congress meant
by “reasonable period of time.” The FCC contended that it
held the power to resolve the ambiguity, and that its determi-
nation that it possessed this interpretive power was itself enti-
tled to Chevron deference.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that
Chevron deference is indeed appropriate for agencies’ interpre-
tations of statutory ambiguities concerning the scope of their
own authority. He explained that the proposed distinction
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional statutory inter-
pretations is “a mirage,”9 “an empty distraction,”10 and a dis-
tinction that would require federal judges to engage in
“waste[ful] . . . mental acrobatics” akin to those of a “haruspex,
sifting the entrails of vast statutory schemes.”11 In every case
concerning an agency’s statutory interpretations, the Court
said, the question is always the same: has the agency “gone
More than Marriage
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beyond what Congress has permitted it to do”?12
Joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, Chief Justice Roberts
dissented, expressing grave reservations about the broad scope
of administrative agencies’ powers in modern American gov-
ernment. The Chief Justice argued that, with “hundreds of fed-
eral agencies poking into every nook and cranny of [the aver-
age citizen’s] daily life,” the Court should be loath to expand
agencies’ powers still further.13 “An agency interpretation war-
rants [Chevron] deference,” the Chief Justice wrote, “only if
Congress has delegated authority to definitively interpret a
particular ambiguity in a particular manner. Whether Congress
has done so must be determined by the court on its own before
Chevron can apply.”14
ARBITRATION
HONORING THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
In three rulings handed down during the prior Term,15 the
Court expressed frustration with lower courts for failing to fol-
low the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In
November 2012, the Court picked up where it left off by unan-
imously reversing a judgment of the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard.16 Nitro-Lift had
entered into contracts with two of its employees. Those con-
tracts contained noncompetition clauses, as well as clauses
requiring arbitration to settle any differences that might arise
between the parties. After the employees left Nitro-Lift to work
for a competitor, Nitro-Lift sought to enforce the noncompeti-
tion agreements through arbitration. The employees, however,
went to state court seeking a declaration that the noncompeti-
tion agreements were unenforceable under state law. The Okla-
homa Supreme Court found that the noncompetition agree-
ments were “void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma’s
public policy.”17 In a unanimous per curiam ruling, the
Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the FAA permitted
the state courts to pass judgment on the validity of the arbitra-
tion provisions themselves, but—having accepted the trial
court’s determination that those provisions were valid—the
Oklahoma Supreme Court improperly “assumed the arbitra-
tor’s role by declaring the
noncompetition agreements
null and void.”18
CLASS ARBITRATION
In two cases last Term, the
Court addressed issues relat-
ing to class arbitration. Build-
ing on the previously estab-
lished principle that “a party
may not be compelled . . . to
submit to class arbitration
unless there is a contractual
basis for concluding that the
party agreed to do so,”19 the
Court in Oxford Health Plans
LLC v. Sutter20 confronted a dispute between a health-insur-
ance company and a proposed class of physicians. On two sep-
arate occasions, the insurer had asked an arbitrator to deter-
mine whether the insurer and the physicians had agreed upon
class arbitration (as some of the physicians contended), and on
both occasions the arbitrator determined that they had. The
insurer then asked a federal court to vacate the arbitrator’s
determination under Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, arguing that
the arbitrator had “exceeded [his] powers.”21
Led by Justice Kagan, the Court unanimously ruled that it
would be inappropriate to disturb the arbitrator’s finding that
class arbitration was within the scope of the parties’ agreement.
The Court stressed that it was not necessarily agreeing with the
arbitrator’s reading of the contract.22 Rather, the Justices’ deci-
sion turned on the narrow scope of judicial review:
All we say is that convincing a court of an arbitrator’s
error—even a grave error—is not enough. So long as the
arbitrator was “arguably construing” the contract—
which this one was—a court may not correct his mis-
takes under § 10(a)(4). The potential for those mistakes
is the price of agreeing to arbitration.23
12. Id. at 1869.
13. Id. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The majority did not
believe its ruling expanded agencies’ power. See, e.g., id. at 1872
(“The U.S. Reports are shot through with applications of Chevron
to agencies’ constructions of the scope of their own jurisdic-
tion.”).
14. Id. at 1883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote sepa-
rately. Although he denominated his opinion a concurrence in
part and a concurrence in the judgment, he substantively aligned
himself, in part, with the dissent. See, e.g., id. at 1876 (“The ques-
tion whether Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to
provide an interpretation that carries the force of law is for the
judge to answer independently.”).
15. CompuCredit v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); Marmet
Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012); KPMG
LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011).
16. 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (per curiam).
17. Howard v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC, 273 P.3d 20, 27 (Okla.
2011).
18. Nitro-Lift Technologies, 133 S. Ct. at 503.
19. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010)
(emphasis omitted).
20. 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).
21. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (authorizing federal courts to vacate arbitra-
tors’ awards “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers”).
22. Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Alito filed a brief concurrence,
underscoring the implausibility of the arbitrator’s finding on the
merits and indicating that—absent a decision like the one the
insurer made here to submit the issue to the arbitrator in the first
instance—courts should be reluctant to find that the availability
of class arbitration is indeed an issue for arbitrators to decide. In
her opinion for the Court, Justice Kagan emphasized that the
Court has not yet determined whether “the availability of class
arbitration is a so-called ‘question of arbitrability’” that courts
ordinarily can review de novo. See Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct.
at 2068 n.2.
23. Id. at 2070 (quoting E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers,
531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)).
[T]he Court 
unanimously ruled
that it would be 
inappropriate to
disturb the 
arbitrator’s finding
that class 
arbitration was
within the scope 
of the parties’
agreement.
The class-arbitration issue in
American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant24 proved to be
more controversial. Merchants
who accepted American Express
(Amex) cards brought a class-
action lawsuit against the com-
pany, arguing that Amex violated
federal antitrust laws by using its
monopoly power in the market
for charge cards to force the mer-
chants to pay above-market fees
for transactions involving Amex
credit cards. Amex sought to
compel individual arbitration
pursuant to a contractual arbitra-
tion clause, pointing out that the merchants not only had
agreed to arbitrate any claims they might have against the com-
pany, but also that they had waived their ability to pursue their
claims as a class. The merchants objected, arguing that their
individual best-case recoveries would amount to only a frac-
tion of the costs they each would have to incur to prove the
merits of their antitrust claims. To preclude them from collec-
tively pursuing their claims in court, they argued, thus would
frustrate the purposes of the antitrust laws by effectively
shielding Amex from liability.
Led by Justice Scalia, a majority of the Court ruled in favor
of Amex, stating that “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an
affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”25
The Court acknowledged that, in past cases, it had developed
an “effective vindication” doctrine, under which a court may
invalidate an arbitration agreement if it amounts to “‘a
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory reme-
dies.’” 26 The Court found, however, that “the fact that it is not
worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does
not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that rem-
edy.”27 Joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice Kagan
dissented, arguing that the case fell squarely within the effec-
tive-vindication doctrine.
COPYRIGHTS: THE FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE
In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,28 the Court finally
brought clarity to the application of the first-sale doctrine to
goods manufactured abroad—an issue on which it had reached
an unilluminating 4-4 split in 2010.29 Under the Copyright
Act, a copyright owner generally has the exclusive right to dis-
tribute copies of the copyrighted work. Under Section 109(a)
of the Act, however, the copyright owner can only control the
first sale of a given copy—once someone else has become the
copy’s lawful owner, that new owner can sell or distribute the
copy however he or she would like.
The first-sale doctrine’s application to goods manufactured
within the United States is clear. But what about goods manu-
factured abroad? Suppose, for example, that a book publisher
charges more for a copyrighted textbook in one region of the
world than another, and wants to prevent a profit seeker from
buying copies in the inexpensive region and then selling those
copies in the more expensive region at prices somewhat lower
than those charged by the publisher itself. Does the first-sale
doctrine cut off the publisher’s ability to complain? By a 6-3
vote, the Kirtsaeng Court answered that question in the affir-
mative. Led by Justice Breyer, a majority found no evidence
that, when settling upon the language of Section 109(a), Con-
gress intended to impose a geographical restriction on the first-
sale-doctrine’s application.30 Manufacturers of copyrighted
works who wish to segment their international markets will
now likely take their fight to Congress. 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
THE MARRIAGE CASES
The two intensely watched marriage cases that the Court
decided last Term—Hollingsworth v. Perry31 and United States v.
Windsor32—yielded the Term’s highest-profile jurisdictional
rulings. The facts in Hollingsworth will still be fresh in most
readers’ minds. In the fall of 2008, California voters approved
Proposition 8, banning same-sex marriage. When two same-
sex couples filed a lawsuit challenging Prop 8’s constitutional-
ity, California officials refused to defend it. In place of those
officials, the district court permitted Dennis Hollingsworth
and others who had led the charge on Prop 8 (collectively
referred to here as “Hollingsworth”) to intervene as parties.
Following a trial, the district court declared Prop 8 unconsti-
tutional. When Hollingsworth appealed, the Ninth Circuit
asked the California Supreme Court to weigh in on whether
Hollingsworth had the power to defend Prop 8 on the state’s
behalf. After California’s high court confirmed that he did, the
Ninth Circuit took jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s
ruling (albeit on grounds narrower than those that the district
court had cited). The Court granted Hollingsworth’s petition
for certiorari, asking the parties to brief both the merits and the
question of Hollingsworth’s standing.
The Justices ultimately divided 5-4, although not along
familiar ideological lines. Disposing of the case entirely on
jurisdictional grounds, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the
majority, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan. The Court first determined that Hollingsworth himself
had no personal stake in the case; his only interest was a gen-
eralized desire “to vindicate the constitutional validity of a
[A] majority of
the court ruled in
favor of Amex,
stating that “the
antitrust laws do
not guarantee
an affordable
procedural path
to the 
vindication of
every claim.”
24. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
25. Id. at 2309.
26. Id. at 2310 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)).
27. Id. at 2311.
28. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
29. See Costco Wholesale Corp v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
Justice Kagan recused herself in Costco.
30. Joined by Justice Kennedy and (in part) by Justice Scalia, Justice
Ginsburg dissented. She argued, inter alia, that the Court’s ruling
was at odds with the position taken by the United States in inter-
national negotiations, and thus “risks undermining the United
States’ credibility on the world stage.” Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at
1385 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
31. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
32. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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33. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662.
34. Id. at 2666.
35. Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2671 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
37. BLAG’s decision to intervene fell along party lines, with the three
Republican members favoring the move and the two Democrats
opposing it.
38. 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
39. Id. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion).
43. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
generally applicable California law.”33 Turning to the more dif-
ficult legal question, the majority found that Hollingsworth
did not have standing to assert the interests of the State of Cal-
ifornia, notwithstanding the California Supreme Court’s find-
ing to the contrary. Hollingsworth had argued that he was
authorized to speak as an agent of the people of California, but
the Court disagreed, pointing out that Hollingsworth and his
fellow Prop 8 proponents “answer to no one; they decide for
themselves, with no review, what arguments to make and how
to make them,” they are not subject to removal, and they owe
no fiduciary obligations to the people of California.34
Joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor, Justice
Kennedy dissented, arguing that the California Supreme Court’s
findings regarding Hollingsworth’s power to speak for the state
were “fully sufficient to establish the standing and adversity
that are requisites for justiciability under Article III.”35 Far from
finding Hollingsworth’s autonomy problematic, Justice
Kennedy argued that Hollingsworth’s independence was inte-
gral to California’s embrace of ballot initiatives.  The initiative
system provides Californians with a vehicle for circumventing
state officials, Justice Kennedy said, and it undermines that sys-
tem “if the very officials the initiative process seeks to circum-
vent are the only parties who can defend an enacted initiative
when it is challenged in a legal proceeding.”36
In Windsor, the fight was over Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA). Section 3 stated that, for purposes of all
federal statutory and administrative law, the term “marriage”
referred only to heterosexual unions and the term “spouse”
referred only to individuals joined in such unions. Pursuant to
federal tax laws and DOMA, the federal government collected
estate taxes totaling more than $360,000 from Edith Windsor
after Windsor’s female spouse died. Windsor filed suit alleging
a violation of her equal-protection rights, accurately pointing
out that she would not have been required to pay those federal
taxes if her spouse had been a man. Just as California officials
declined to defend Prop 8 in Hollingsworth, the Obama Admin-
istration declined to defend DOMA but said that it would con-
tinue to obey that legislation and would withhold the disputed
funds pending completion of the judicial proceedings. Given
the Executive’s decision not to defend Section 3, the House of
Representative’s Bipartisan Leadership Advisory Group (BLAG)
petitioned to intervene to defend the legislation.37 The district
court granted BLAG’s petition, but ultimately ruled in Wind-
sor’s favor on the merits. After the Second Circuit affirmed, both
the United States and BLAG petitioned for certiorari—the
United States seeking affirmance and BLAG seeking reversal.
The Court granted the United States’ petition, asking the parties
to address both the constitutionality of Section 3 and whether
the Court had jurisdiction to say anything about the matter.
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
Justice Kennedy wrote for the
majority, finding that the Court had
jurisdiction. The Court distin-
guished between standing require-
ments imposed by Article III and
those imposed by the Court in the
name of prudence. In this case, Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote, the United
States satisfied the requirements of
Article III (notwithstanding its
agreement with the Second Circuit
and with Windsor) because the
national treasury stood to lose the
money that Windsor contended was
rightly hers. The Court acknowl-
edged that a prevailing party ordinarily lacks standing to appeal,
but said that this was a prudential concern rather than a dictate
of Article III. The Court concluded that it was appropriate to
take jurisdiction because BLAG—even if not formally a proper
party to the action—had provided the Court with a “sharp
adversarial presentation of the issues,”38 and vast resources
would have to be spent on Section 3 litigation involving thou-
sands of people across the country if the Court refused to hear
Windsor’s case. (I discuss the Court’s ruling on the merits else-
where in this overview, under the “Fifth Amendment” heading.)
Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion in Windsor, but he
agreed that the Court had jurisdiction. For Justice Alito, the
key to the Court’s power to hear the case lay in BLAG’s inter-
vention and vigorous advocacy on DOMA’s behalf. “[I]n the
narrow category of cases in which a court strikes down an Act
of Congress and the Executive declines to defend the Act,” he
wrote, “Congress both has standing to defend the undefended
statute and is a proper party to do so.”39
Finding no jurisdiction, Justice Scalia dissented, joined by
Justice Thomas and, in part, by Chief Justice Roberts. Accus-
ing the majority of making a “jaw-dropping” assertion of judi-
cial authority,40 Justice Scalia said that the Court had never
before agreed to decide a legal question “when every party
agrees with both its nominal opponent and the court below on
that question’s answer.”41 He argued that the majority “envi-
sions a Supreme Court standing (or rather enthroned) at the
apex of government, empowered to decide all constitutional
questions, always and everywhere ‘primary’ in its role.”42
STANDING AND FUTURE INJURIES
Although overshadowed by Hollingsworth and Windsor,
another broadly consequential jurisdictional ruling came
down in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.43 In that case,
attorneys, journalists, human-rights workers, and others
sought declaratory and injunctive relief concerning 50 U.S.C.
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44. The legislation defines “United States persons” as citizens of the
United States, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
and certain corporations and associations. See 50 U.S.C. §
1801(i).
45. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 158 (1990), and other authorities).
46. Id. at 1148. Justice Alito explained that the plaintiffs were assum-
ing that the government would indeed attempt to target individu-
als with whom the plaintiffs were in contact, that the government
would rely upon Section 1881a rather than another source of sur-
veillance authority, that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court would approve the government’s surveillance request, that
the government would successfully intercept some of the targets’
communications, and that the plaintiffs would be parties to some
of those intercepted communications. 
47. Id. at 1150 n.5 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754-55 (2010)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. Cf. id.at 1147 (“[W]e have often found a lack of standing in cases
in which the Judiciary has been requested to review actions of the
political branches in the fields of intelligence gathering and for-
eign affairs . . . .”).
52. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
54. The United States subsequently granted the plaintiffs political asy-
lum. The plaintiffs live in the United States today.
55. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan.
§ 1881a, a provision of the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008. Under
Section 1881a, the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court may grant
the Attorney General and the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence permis-
sion to conduct surveillance on the
electronic communications of indi-
viduals who both are not “United
States persons” and are reasonably
believed to be located outside the
country, even if the government does
not precisely specify the locations
where the surveillance will occur.44 The plaintiffs claimed that
Section 1881a violates the First and Fourth Amendments, Arti-
cle III, and the separation of powers.
To demonstrate that they had standing to challenge the legis-
lation’s constitutionality, Amnesty International USA and the
other plaintiffs advanced two theories of harm. First, they
argued that there was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that
the government would conduct surveillance on some of the
individuals with whom the plaintiffs would have future com-
munications. Second, they said that the fear of such surveillance
was already prompting them to engage in costly measures aimed
at avoiding government interception, such as traveling long dis-
tances to communicate with their contacts in person.
Dividing 5-4 along familiar lines, the Court held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing. Writing for the majority, Justice
Alito invoked the Court’s prior indication that “‘threatened
injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in
fact.’”45 In the eyes of the majority, the plaintiffs’ first theory of
harm failed to meet that stringent requirement because it relied
upon “a highly attenuated chain of possibilities.”46 With
respect to the plaintiffs’ second theory of harm, the Court
found that the plaintiffs could not manufacture standing by
incurring present-day costs aimed at avoiding future specula-
tive harms. Justice Alito conceded in a footnote that some of
the Court’s prior standing cases used language less daunting
than “certainly impending” to characterize the standard the
Court uses to evaluate claims of future injuries; sometimes, he
acknowledged, the Court has said there must be “a ‘substantial
risk’ that the harm will occur.”47 The majority concluded that,
“to the extent that the ‘substantial risk’ standard is relevant and
is distinct from the ‘clearly impending’ requirement,” the
plaintiffs had failed to meet it.48
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer concluded that the
harms claimed by the plaintiffs were “as likely to take place as
are most future events that commonsense inference and ordi-
nary knowledge of human nature tell us will happen.”49 The
dissent argued that the majority’s insistence upon certainty con-
flicted with numerous prior cases in which federal courts have
adjudicated “actions for injunctions and for declaratory relief
aimed at preventing future activities that are reasonably likely
or highly likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place. ”50
In future cases, courts and litigants will scrutinize the
majority’s discussion of the two competing standards. Did the
Clapper Court stress the “certainly impending” language
because issues of national security were at stake?51 Or does
Clapper instead signal that five Justices might now be
inclined to demand a more compelling showing in all cases
in which plaintiffs seek standing on the strength of feared
future harm?
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,52 the Court found
that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) does not provide jurisdiction
over causes of action alleging violations of the law of nations
occurring within other sovereigns’ territories.53 Relying upon
the ATS for federal jurisdiction, Nigerian nationals now living
in the United States had filed suit against Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Company and two other entities. The plaintiffs alleged
that, after they began to protest the environmental effects of
the defendants’ oil-exploration activities in Nigeria, the defen-
dants helped the Nigerian Government brutally maltreat the
plaintiffs in violation of the law of nations.54 Led by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, the Court ruled that there was nothing in the text
or history of the ATS to rebut the presumption against extrater-
ritorial application of federal statutes. Joined by three col-
leagues, Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, arguing that
the ATS would have provided jurisdiction if (contrary to fact)
the defendants’ conduct had “substantially and adversely
affect[ed] an important American national interest.”55
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56. 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013).
57. Id. at 727 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000)).
58. Id. at 728.
59. 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2012).
60. Art. 1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11, at 7.
61. See id. Art. 3; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (granting concurrent
jurisdiction to federal and state courts); id. § 11603(d) (directing
courts to decide these cases “in accordance with the Conven-
tion”).
62. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1025.
63. 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013).
64. 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013).
65. Id. at 1533 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
66. Collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act bear a
resemblance to class actions but are a different procedural animal.
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (authorizing “one or more employees [to
sue] for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employ-
ees similarly situated”).
COVENANTS NOT TO SUE
In Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,56 the Court unanimously ruled
that a defendant’s counterclaim had been mooted by the plain-
tiff’s covenant not to sue. Nike had initiated the litigation,
alleging that two lines of shoes marketed by Already infringed
a Nike trademark. Already counterclaimed, contending that
Nike’s trademark was invalid. Months later, Nike gave Already
a “Covenant Not to Sue,” promising not to bring any claim
against Already concerning Already’s existing designs or any
future designs that are “colorable imitations” of Already’s exist-
ing products. On the strength of that covenant, Nike moved to
dismiss not only its own claim, but Already’s counterclaim, as
well. Already resisted, contending that there was still a live dis-
pute between the parties.
Writing for the full Court, Chief Justice Roberts identified
the relevant test: “[O]ur cases have explained that ‘a defendant
claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the
formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected
to recur.’”57 The Court found that Nike had satisfied that bur-
den here. By its very terms, the covenant was “uncondi-
tional[]” and “irrevocabl[e],”58 and Already had failed to iden-
tify any realistic circumstance in which it might infringe upon
Nike’s trademark and yet not be protected by the covenant.
THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION REMEDIES
ACT
In Chafin v. Chafin,59 the Court addressed a jurisdictional
matter concerning the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction (the Convention) and its
domestic implementing legislation, the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). The Convention aims to
ensure “the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to
or retained in any Contracting State.”60 ICARA gives state and
federal courts concurrent jurisdiction to grant a petition for a
child’s return to the country in which he or she “was habitu-
ally resident immediately before the [wrongful] removal or
retention.”61 In Chafin, the district court had ruled that Mr.
Chafin was wrongfully retaining his daughter in the United
States and that the girl’s country of habitual residence was
Scotland, where she previously had lived with her mother, Ms.
Chafin. Within hours of the ruling, Ms. Chafin and her daugh-
ter were on a plane bound for Scotland. Mr. Chafin appealed to
the Eleventh Circuit, but the appellate court dismissed the
appeal as moot, reasoning that it was powerless to secure the
child’s return from a foreign country.
The Court unanimously reversed. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts explained that whether the appellate
court could secure the child’s
return to the United States was
a matter separate from whether
the Chafins’ dispute continued
to present a live controversy.
“Enforcement of the order may
be uncertain if Ms. Chafin
chooses to defy it,” the Chief
Justice wrote, “but such uncer-
tainty does not typically render
cases moot.”62
THE CLASS ACTION 
FAIRNESS ACT
In Standard Fire Insurance
Co. v. Knowles,63 the Court unanimously held that a would-be
class-action plaintiff cannot defeat federal jurisdiction under
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) by stipulating, before
class certification, that the class will seek damages less than
CAFA’s $5 million jurisdictional threshold. Writing for the
Court, Justice Breyer acknowledged that, by stipulating to
damages that fall below the applicable amount-in-controversy
requirement, an individual plaintiff can indeed defeat federal
jurisdiction. The difference here, Justice Breyer explained, was
that the named plaintiff lacked the authority to bind absent
members of the proposed class because the class had not yet
been certified.
MOOTNESS AND OFFERS OF JUDGMENT
Whether Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk64 merits men-
tion here depends in part on whether Justice Kagan was right
when, in dissent, she advised readers to “[f]eel free to relegate
the majority’s decision to the furthest reaches of your mind:
The situation it addresses should never arise again.”65 Readers
may decide for themselves. Laura Symczyk filed a “collective
action”66 on behalf of herself and other employees, charging
that their employer had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
by refusing to compensate them for some of the time they had
worked. The employer served an offer of judgment upon Sym-
czyk, offering to pay all of her damages, fees, and costs, but
Symczyk declined to accept. The employer then moved to dis-
miss the case as moot. The Third Circuit found that Symczyk’s
individual claim was indeed moot but that the larger collective
action was not. When the employer took the case to the
Supreme Court, Symczyk failed to seek certiorari on the Third
Circuit’s finding that her individual claim no longer presented
a live controversy.
Writing for the five-member majority, Justice Thomas said
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67. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1529.
68. Id. at 1535 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1534 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
70. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689-90 (2013).
71. Id. at 2692.
72. Id. at 2693.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2694.
75. Id. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). Justice Kagan recused herself.
78. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f).
that, given Symczyk’s failure to
preserve her right to challenge
the lower court’s mootness ruling,
the Court would assume, without
deciding, that her individual
claim was indeed moot. Because
no other employee had opted in
as a plaintiff, Justice Thomas
wrote, Symczyk’s entire lawsuit
“became moot when her individ-
ual claim became moot, because
she lacked any personal interest
in representing others in this
action.”67 Writing for the four
dissenters, Justice Kagan argued
that the starting premise of the
Court’s ruling was “bogus”
because Symczyk’s refusal to
accept her employer’s offer of judgment did not suffice to moot
her individual claim: after Symczyk refused to accept the offer,
she continued to have the same personal stake in the litigation
that she had before the offer of judgment was made. Because
cases like Symczyk’s should never become moot in the future,
she wrote, courts should “never need to reach the issue the
majority resolves.”68 Justice Kagan passed along some advice:
“[A] friendly suggestion to the Third Circuit: Rethink your
mootness-by-unaccepted-offer theory. And a note to all other
courts of appeals: Don’t try this at home.”69
FIFTH AMENDMENT: DOMA AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
As explained above in the summary of the Court’s leading
jurisdictional rulings this past Term, Justice Kennedy joined
with the Court’s four Democratic appointees in Windsor, ruling
that the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitution-
ality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The
same coalition of Justices concluded that Section 3 was uncon-
stitutional. Justice Kennedy devoted several paragraphs to the
proposition that, “[b]y history and tradition the definition and
regulation of marriage . . . has been treated as being within the
authority and realm of the separate States.”70 The majority ulti-
mately concluded, however, that it was unnecessary to decide
whether Section 3 violated constitutional principles of federal-
ism. Instead, the Court used its observations about states’ tra-
ditional prerogatives to help fuel its finding that Section 3 vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and its
implicit principles of equality.
The majority found that states choosing to recognize same-
sex marriages had conferred upon those couples “a dignity and
status of immense import.”71 Through DOMA, Justice
Kennedy wrote, Congress had sought “to injure the very class
[that New York and other states recognizing same-sex mar-
riages have sought] to protect.”72 In the eyes of the majority,
“DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recog-
nizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” helped to
reveal that both the purpose and the effect of that legislation
was “to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a
stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made law-
ful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”73 Justice
Kennedy said that Section 3 “demeans” same-sex couples and
“humiliates” their children.74 Such legislation, the Court
found, violates the protections afforded to same-sex couples by
the Fifth Amendment. Although the Court did not hold that
same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry, there is
much in the Court’s decision that could easily lay the ground-
work for such a ruling further down the road.
Chief Justice Roberts filed a brief dissent, emphasizing that
the Court was not reaching the question of whether a state
today may refuse to permit same-sex marriages. Justice Alito
also dissented, joined in relevant part by Justice Thomas, argu-
ing that the majority’s analysis was driven by an ill-founded
conception of substantive due process and that “the Constitu-
tion simply does not speak to the issue of same-sex mar-
riage.”75 The most strongly worded dissent, however, was filed
by Justice Scalia and joined in relevant part by Justice Thomas.
Justice Scalia accused the majority of deciding the case based
upon a confused hash of pronouncements regarding federal-
ism, due process, and equality, which ultimately boiled down
to an indefensible conception of substantive due process. Jus-
tice Scalia argued that Section 3 should be given nothing more
stringent than rational-basis review and that it could easily sur-
vive it, based upon such governmental objectives as avoiding
difficult choice-of-law issues and honoring prior Congresses’
legislative intentions. He said that the majority had merely
supplanted what it saw as a “hateful moral judgment” with a
morality that the majority deemed “superior,”76 and he unhap-
pily predicted that a majority of the Court will later follow the
path foreshadowed by much of Justice Kennedy’s language and
flatly demand that all states permit same-sex couples to marry.
FIRST AMENDMENT: SPEECH
By a 6-2 vote in Agency for International Development v.
Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.,77 the Court invali-
dated a provision of the United States Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (the Leader-
ship Act). Through that legislation, the federal government
provides billions of dollars to nongovernmental organizations
to help globally combat the ailments signified in the statute’s
title. As a condition of receipt of Leadership Act funds, how-
ever, Congress required grant-seeking organizations to adopt
“a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex traffick-
ing.”78 A group of domestic organizations challenged the law,
explaining that while they did not favor prostitution, they
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feared that adopting the required policy would alienate some
of the governments and prostitutes with whom they worked. 
With Chief Justice Roberts writing for the majority, the
Court held that the challenged condition violated the organiza-
tions’ First Amendment speech rights. Chief Justice Roberts
explained that, in some cases, an organization that objects to a
condition on the receipt of federal funds is left to secure its own
remedy by simply declining the funds, while in other cases the
Court has found that funding conditions unconstitutionally
burden recipients’ speech rights. Acknowledging that the line
between the two classes of cases “is hardly clear,” the Court said
that the distinction “is between conditions that define the lim-
its of the government spending program . . . and conditions that
seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the con-
tours of the program itself.”79 Here, the Court found that the
spending condition went beyond defining Congress’s program,
by trying to restrict what a grant recipient could say “when par-
ticipating in activities on its own time and dime.”80
Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia dissented, arguing
that “a central part of the Government’s HIV/AIDS strategy is
the suppression of prostitution, by which HIV is transmitted.
It is entirely reasonable to admit to participation in the pro-
gram only those who believe in that goal.”81 The “real evil” of
the majority’s ruling, Justice Scalia wrote, is that it exposes the
federal government to lawsuits whenever it “distinguish[es]
between [grant] applicants on a relevant ideological ground.”82
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Proponents of race-conscious admissions decisions at pub-
lic colleges and universities may have breathed at least a shal-
low sigh of relief when—more than eight months after oral
argument—the Court in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
finally handed down its ruling.83 By using a race-neutral
admissions calculus and by automatically offering admission
to all high-school students graduating in the top 10% of their
respective classes, the university had been achieving a measure
of diversity in its undergraduate population.84 Concluding that
it needed still more racial diversity to achieve its objectives, the
university added race to the array of factors that it would
explicitly consider when making at least some of its admis-
sions decisions. Abigail Fisher, a white applicant, was there-
after denied admission and filed suit.
Rather than strike down the university’s use of race in its
admissions decisions (as many predicted), the Court opted by a
7-1 vote to remand the case to the Fifth Circuit for a second
look.85 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy pointed out that
the parties had not asked the Jus-
tices to overrule Grutter v.
Bollinger,86 the 2003 case in
which the Court approved of the
University of Michigan Law
School’s consideration of race
among a constellation of other
diversity factors when making its
admissions decisions. Thus tak-
ing that ruling “as given for pur-
poses of deciding this case,”87
Justice Kennedy explained that
the Fifth Circuit had failed to
apply the level of scrutiny that
Grutter demands. The lower
court acted within Grutter’s
framework when it showed defer-
ence to the university’s conclusion that a racially diverse stu-
dent body was essential to its educational mission, Justice
Kennedy said, but the appellate court erred when it similarly
deferred to the university’s choice of means by which to achieve
that goal. The Fifth Circuit had limited its means-related
inquiry to determining merely whether the university’s decision
to use “‘race as a factor in admissions was made in good
faith.’”88 When it comes to assessing the university’s choice of
means, the Court held, “the University receives no deference.
. . . The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educa-
tional benefits of diversity.”89
In a lengthy concurrence, Justice Thomas reiterated his oppo-
sition to Grutter and argued that, if a court were to apply gen-
uine strict scrutiny, “it would require Texas either to close the
University or to stop discriminating against applicants based on
their race.”90 Justice Thomas drew parallels between the argu-
ments that the university advanced and the arguments that
defenders of racial segregation put forward in the 1950s. Justice
Ginsburg filed a lone dissent, stating that it was clear to her that
the university was acting fully within Grutter’s parameters.
PATENTS: HUMAN GENES
Can a patent be obtained on some of your genes once they
have been isolated from the surrounding DNA material in
which they appear? No, because those isolated genes remain
products of nature. Can a patent be obtained on synthetically
created DNA? Perhaps, because it is not naturally occurring. So
held the Court in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
79. Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2328.
80. Id. at 2330; see also id. (“By requiring recipients to profess a spe-
cific belief, the [condition] goes beyond defining the limits of the
federally funded program to defining the recipient.”).
81. Id. at 2333 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2335 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
84. In the last year in which those two admissions methods were used,
for example, the University secured an entering class of under-
graduates that was 4.5 percent African-American and 16.9 percent
Hispanic.
85. Justice Kagan did not participate.
86. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
87. 133 S. Ct. at 2417. In a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice
Scalia—who continues to oppose Grutter—said that he “join[ed]
the Court’s opinion in full” for the very reason that the parties had
not asked the Court to revisit Grutter here. Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
88. Id. at 2420 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213,
236 (2011)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2426 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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94. 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013).
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96. Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1446.
97. There were others. In Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct.
2466 (2013), for example, the Court ruled 5-4 that the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempts “state-law design-defect
claims that turn on the adequacy of a drug’s warnings.” Id. at
2470.
98. 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
99. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. He also was joined in
relevant part by Justice Kennedy, who wrote separately to express
disagreement with the majority about the applicability of the pre-
sumption against preemption to federal legislation promulgated
under the Elections Clause. The majority found the presumption
inapplicable. Justice Kennedy cautioned against treating the Elec-
tions Clause differently from other constitutional delegations of
federal power. Justices Thomas and Alito filed separate dissents,
rejecting the majority’s finding of preemption.
100. See Marty Lederman, Pyrrhic Victory for Federal Government in
Arizona Voter Registration Case?, SCOTUSBLOG, June 17, 2013,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/pyrrhic-victory-for-federal-
government-in-arizona-voter-registration-case (“This unani-
mous holding resolves a long-unresolved question about Con-
gress’s power to determine who may vote in federal elections. 
. . .”). Professor Lederman argues that a number of enacted and
proposed federal laws may now be constitutionally suspect. See,
e.g., id. (“The holding would . . . appear to preclude any future
efforts to enact a federal statute restricting state felon disenfran-
chisement laws.”).
101. Indeed, Arizona already sought such permission back in 2005,
but the EAC’s commissioners divided 2-2 on how to respond and
so the request was not approved. Arizona did not follow that
(in)action with a petition for judicial review. The Court stated
that it was not aware of any reason why Arizona could not refile
its request with the EAC, with the hope of securing a favorable
ruling.
Genetics, Inc.91 With respect to the
naturally occurring genes that Myr-
iad Genetics had isolated—genes
that are powerfully associated with
breast and ovarian cancer when
mutations occur within them—the
Court found that “Myriad did not
create anything. To be sure, it found
an important and useful gene [two
of them, actually], but separating
that gene from its surrounding
genetic material is not an act of
invention.”92 Myriad’s synthetically
created DNA material, however, was
potentially patentable because “the
lab technician unquestionably cre-
ates something new when [produc-
ing it].”93
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE LAW-ENFORCEMENT 
PROVISO
In Millbrook v. United States,94 the Court resolved a circuit
split concerning the “law enforcement proviso” of the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA).95 Kim Millbrook alleged that, while
in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, correctional
officers sexually assaulted him. He filed suit against the federal
government under the FTCA, which waives the government’s
sovereign immunity from a wide range of tort suits. The gov-
ernment claimed immunity, arguing that, under the statute’s
law-enforcement proviso, the government is liable for its law-
enforcement officers’ intentional torts only when those torts
occur in the course of executing a search, seizing evidence, or
making an arrest, none of which was the case here. The Third
Circuit accepted the government’s argument and dismissed the
case. The Court unanimously reversed and reinstated Mill-
brook’s claim, finding no basis in the statute’s plain text for the
Third Circuit’s interpretation. The Court held that the law-
enforcement proviso’s waiver of immunity “extends to acts or
omissions of law enforcement officers that arise within the
scope of their employment, regardless of whether the officers
are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are
executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.”96
SUPREMACY CLAUSE: PREEMPTION
VOTER REGISTRATION AND PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP
Three preemption rulings particularly merit mention.97 In
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.,98 the Court
found that the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 pre-
empted Arizona’s requirement that an individual present docu-
mentary proof of citizenship when registering to vote. The
nation’s standard voter-registration form requires an applicant
to swear under penalty of perjury that he or she is a United
States citizen. Arizona went further by demanding a copy of
the applicant’s passport, birth certificate, or other documentary
proof of citizenship. Led by Justice Scalia, a majority of the
Court found Arizona’s requirement preempted.99
Justice Scalia nevertheless explained for the majority that
the door is not necessarily closed on Arizona’s effort to insist
upon documentation of citizenship. The Court categorically
declared that the Elections Clause gives the states—not Con-
gress—the power to determine who may vote. (That is a sig-
nificant holding in its own right.100) The Court further
observed that, under federal law, a state may ask the federal
government’s Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to sup-
plement the standard voter-registration form with additional
requirements aimed at helping the state determine whether a
given applicant meets the state’s prescribed voter qualifica-
tions. Arizona can thus ask the EAC to amend the registration
form used in Arizona by requiring documentary proof of citi-
zenship.101 If the EAC refuses to approve the state’s request, the
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In his dissent, Justice Thomas expressed strong sympathy for the
view that Arizona is constitutionally entitled to demand docu-
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110. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, reiterating his view
that preemption analysis should remain strictly confined to a
search for conflicts between the texts of state and federal laws.
Justice Alito similarly concurred in the judgment, arguing that
FEGLIA should not be accorded preemptive effect when (unlike
in this case) it is indisputably clear that the deceased did not
want his or her original beneficiary designation under FEGLIA
to be honored.
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Court said, then the Administrative Procedures Act authorizes
the state to seek judicial review.102 In their separate dissents,
Justices Thomas and Alito pointed out the not-insignificant
complication that the EAC currently does not have any mem-
bers, and so might not be in the business of fielding states’
requests. The majority responded by suggesting that, if the
EAC remains defunct, Arizona “might” be able either to obtain
mandamus relief or “to assert a constitutional right to demand
concrete evidence of citizenship apart from the [standard fed-
eral form].”103
MEDICAID AND TORT RECOVERIES
In Wos v. E.M.A.,104 the Court held that a state’s 
irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all statutory presumption
[that a given percentage of a Medicaid beneficiary’s tort
recovery was allocated for medical expenses and thus is
owed to the state] is incompatible with the Medicaid
Act’s clear mandate that a State may not demand any por-
tion of a beneficiary’s tort recovery except the share that
is attributable to medical expenses.105
The Court thus found that federal law preempted North
Carolina’s irrebuttable presumption that one-third of a Medic-
aid beneficiary’s tort recovery was for medical costs. Joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts argued in
dissent that neither Congress nor the Department of Health
and Human Services had ever clearly stated “that segregating
medical expenses from a lump-sum recovery must be done on
a case-specific, after-the-fact basis, rather than pursuant to a
general rule spelled out in advance.”106
LIFE-INSURANCE BENEFICIARIES
In Hillman v. Maretta,107 all of the Justices agreed (albeit for
differing reasons) that the Federal Employees’ Group Life
Insurance Act (FEGLIA), which creates a life-insurance pro-
gram for federal employees, preempted a Virginia statutory
provision concerning the rightful ownership of life-insurance
proceeds. FEGLIA states that an employee may designate a
beneficiary “in a signed and witnessed writing” and that any
change of beneficiary must be made in writing and filed with
the federal government.108 A Virginia statute stated, however,
that divorce automatically terminates a life-insurance-benefi-
ciary designation benefiting the former spouse. The Virginia
legislation further stated that, if the termination-upon-divorce
provision were preempted, then the person who would have
received the insurance bene-
fits absent the preemption
had a cause of action against
the former spouse. Warren
Hillman (a federal employee)
designated his then-spouse
Judy Maretta as his FEGLIA
beneficiary, but he failed to
change the designation after
the marriage ended and he
married Jacqueline Hillman.
After Warren died and the
government paid the insur-
ance proceeds to Judy, Jacque-
line filed an action against her
pursuant to the Virginia
statute. The parties agreed
that FEGLIA preempted Virginia’s termination-upon-divorce
provision but disagreed about the fate of the provision that
purported to make Judy liable to Jacqueline for the proceeds
she had received.
Led by Justice Sotomayor, a majority of the Court found
that Virginia’s assignment of a cause of action to Jacqueline
conflicted with the policies and purposes underlying FEGLIA.
The Court reasoned that one of Congress’s purposes was to
ensure that the “duly named beneficiary will receive the insur-
ance benefits and be able to make use of them.”109 Because Vir-
ginia’s assignment of a cause of action undermined that federal
purpose, the Court found it preempted.110
TAKINGS: LAND-USE PERMITS
A well-known pair of sibling cases—Nollan111 and
Dolan112—operates to ensure that a governmental body cannot
use its power to grant or withhold land-use permits to get for
free what the Takings Clause would otherwise require it to pay
just compensation to obtain. Nollan and Dolan do that consti-
tutional work by establishing that a government cannot condi-
tion its approval of a land-use permit on the landowner’s will-
ingness to surrender an interest in his or her property, unless
there is a “nexus” and “rough proportionality” between the
condition that the government wishes to impose and the
effects that the landowner’s proposed new land use is expected
to have. The application of Nollan and Dolan to conditions
demanding the relinquishment of an interest in real property is
clear. But what if the government instead demands that the
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landowner pay money? Do the
nexus and rough-proportionality
tests still apply?
Dividing 5-4 along familiar
lines, the Court answered that
question affirmatively in Koontz v.
St. Johns River Water Management
District.113 The government in that
case demanded that a permit
seeker either reduce the size of his
proposed development or pick up
the tab for mitigation projects
(such as replacing culverts or fill-
ing in ditches) on other properties
to which the landowner had no
connection. “Mindful of the spe-
cial vulnerability of land use permit applicants to extortionate
demands for money,” Justice Alito and his colleagues in the
majority concluded that Nollan and Dolan should apply to gov-
ernmental demands for real property and money alike.114 Writ-
ing for the dissenters, Justice Kagan argued that takings con-
cerns are absent when a government demands the payment of
money rather than the transfer of an interest in real property,
and she warned that the majority’s ruling threatens to “turn[]
a broad array of local land-use regulations into federal consti-
tutional questions.”115
TITLE VII
In a pair of rulings handed down on the final Monday of the
Term, the Court construed Title VII in ways that many employ-
ers are likely to celebrate and many employment-discrimina-
tion plaintiffs are likely to lament. 
In Vance v. Ball State University,116 with Justice Alito writing
for the majority, the Court ruled 5-4 that a person is a “super-
visor” for purposes of Title VII—and that his or her actions can
thus create vicarious liability for the employer under Title
VII—only when the person has been authorized by the
employer to make significant changes in the plaintiff’s employ-
ment status (such as by hiring, firing, demoting, or transfer-
ring the plaintiff).
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nas-
sar,117 with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court
ruled 5-4 that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim against an
employer under Title VII must prove that retaliation for the
plaintiff’s opposition to workplace discrimination was a but-for
cause of the adverse employment action that he or she suf-
fered. Based on its reading of the text, structure, and history of
Title VII, the Court refused to adopt the lesser requirement
that a plaintiff prove only that retaliation was one of multiple
motivating factors for the employer’s actions.
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice
Ginsburg dissented in both cases. In Vance, she argued that the
Court’s precedents made clear that “harassment by an
employee with power to direct subordinates’ day-to-day work
activities should trigger vicarious employer liability.”118 In
Nassar, she argued that the majority had undermined Con-
gress’s effort to provide employees with strong protection
against retaliation for trying to vindicate their workplace
rights. Justice Ginsburg closed both of her dissents with a plea
to Congress to restore what she believed was Title VII’s
intended meaning.
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: SECTION 4 AND PRECLEARANCE
In its penultimate public session of the Term, a closely
divided Court in Shelby County v. Holder119 produced a monu-
mental ruling on the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the Act). Sec-
tion 5 of the Act required certain states and localities to obtain
the approval of the United States Attorney General or a three-
judge federal court before making any changes in their voting
laws or procedures. The point of the preclearance requirement
was to ensure that a given jurisdiction’s proposed changes did
not serve as intended or unintended vehicles for racial discrim-
ination in that jurisdiction’s electoral affairs. Section 4 provided
the coverage formula for determining which states and locali-
ties were subject to Section 5’s preclearance requirement.120 As
it had for roughly four decades, Section 4 targeted jurisdictions
based on data (such as voter-registration and voter-turnout fig-
ures) from the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 2006, opting to
leave that coverage formula unchanged, Congress extended the
Act’s preclearance regime for an additional 25 years.
The Court in Shelby County declared Section 4’s coverage
formula unconstitutional. Writing for the five-member major-
ity, Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly invoked the opinion he
wrote for the Court four years earlier in Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder.121 In that case, the
Court in dictum had expressed skepticism about the constitu-
tionality of the Act’s preclearance system, stating that “the Act
imposes current burdens and must be justified by current
needs.”122 Congress took no action in the interim, however,
and the Shelby County Court concluded that the time had come
for the Justices to respond.
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the Act’s preclearance
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regime sat in strong tension with two constitutional principles:
states ordinarily regulate their own elections and the federal
government ordinarily must treat the states as “equal sover-
eign[s],” making no distinctions between them.123 Under the
Act, the Court explained, “[s]tates must beseech the Federal
Government for permission to implement laws that they
would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their
own,”124 and nine states and several additional jurisdictions
are singled out for a preclearance requirement that other states
and localities can wholly ignore. Chief Justice Roberts said that
Section 4’s coverage formula “is based on decades-old data and
eradicated practices,”125 pointing out, for example, that in the
covered jurisdictions today, there no longer is any significant
difference in voter-turnout rates among whites and African-
Americans. The Court stopped short of striking down Section
5’s preclearance requirement,126 but held that Section 5 must
remain idle unless and until Congress devises a coverage for-
mula “based on current conditions.”127
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice
Ginsburg dissented. Invoking mere rationality review,128 she
argued that Congress had gone to extraordinary lengths in
2006 to assess the continuing problem of racial discrimination
in the jurisdictions captured by Section 4’s coverage formula,
and that the factual record made it clear—including in Shelby
County itself—that Congress had ample reasons to keep Sec-
tion 4’s coverage formula in force. “Throwing out preclearance
when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop dis-
criminatory changes,” she wrote, “is like throwing away your
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”129
OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS
In Maracich v. Spears,130 the Court held that the Driver’s Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) does not permit attorneys
to obtain or use individuals’ personal information from a state’s
department of motor vehicles for the “predominant purpose”
of soliciting possible clients. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy,
the majority found that allowing attorneys to use drivers’ per-
sonal information to solicit clients would substantially under-
mine Congress’s goal of protecting individuals’ privacy.
In McBurney v. Young,131 the Court unanimously held that
neither the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV nor
the dormant Commerce Clause barred Virginia from limiting
the benefits of its Freedom of Information Act to Virginia citi-
zens.
In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,132 the Court construed key
provisions of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 in favor of
a non-Indian couple who had
adopted a girl of partially Indian
descent, and against the girl’s
biological father, who initially
showed no interest in acting as
the girl’s parent and who had
never had custody of the child
until, in the girl’s 27th month, a
state court ordered the adoptive
couple to transfer the child to
him.
In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans and Trust
Funds, 133 the Court held that
proof of the materiality of a defendant’s alleged misrepresenta-
tions is not a prerequisite to class certification in a federal secu-
rities-fraud action. Amgen had taken the contrary position,
arguing that proof of materiality at the class-certification stage
is necessary to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that “ques-
tions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members.” The
Court explained that because the issue of materiality is adjudi-
cated under an objective standard, the issue’s resolution is cer-
tain to be common to all class members.
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,134 the Court helped to clear the way
for the Federal Trade Commission to bring antitrust actions
against patent holders and alleged patent infringers (usually, if
not always, the makers of brand-name and generic pharma-
ceuticals, respectively) who enter into “pay to delay” (or
“reverse payment”) agreements. In such an agreement, an
alleged patent infringer agrees to accept financial payment
from the patent holder in exchange for delaying its effort to
bring the allegedly infringing product to market.
In Lefemine v. Wideman,135 the Court held that obtaining an
injunction ordering a defendant to comply with the Constitu-
tion can be sufficient to change the legal relationship between
the litigants and thereby render the plaintiff a “prevailing
party” entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
LOOKING AHEAD
The Court will tackle a number of interesting and broadly
consequential issues next Term. In one of its most widely
anticipated cases, the Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning136 will
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take up an ongoing battle between the White House and some
in the Senate concerning the ability of the President to make
recess appointments during recesses that occur within a single
enumerated session of the Senate, to make recess appoint-
ments to fill vacancies that exist (but did not arise) during a
recess, and to make recess appointments when the Senate is
convening every three days in pro forma sessions.
Affirmative action will make another prominent appearance
on the Court’s docket, when the Court in Schuette v. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action137 considers the constitutionality
of Michigan’s ban on the use of race and sex in admissions
decisions at that state’s public colleges and universities.
Campaign finance will also likely return to the headlines,
when the Court in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commis-
sion138 considers the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act’s biennial limits on how much money a per-
son can contribute to federal political candidates and to non-
candidate committees.
The Court will have an opportunity in Town of Greece v. Gal-
loway139—a case involving prayers at legislative sessions—to
bring greater clarity to its famously tangled Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
In McCullen v. Coakley,140 the Court will consider whether
Massachusetts has committed viewpoint discrimination in vio-
lation of the First Amendment’s Speech Clause by the way in
which it regulates who may enter and speak in areas located
near the entrances to abortion-performing clinics.
In Bond v. United States141—a case involving the Chemical
Weapons Convention, alleged marital infidelities, and the
malicious placement of harmful chemicals on mailboxes and
doorknobs—the Court will be asked to decide whether the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act reaches
the petitioner’s conduct and, if it does, whether Congress
exceeded its delegated powers by (on the petitioner’s account)
authorizing federal criminal prosecutions for conduct that the
Constitution reserves for state and local officials to address.
In Madigan v. Levin,142 the Court will confront a circuit split
on whether employees of state and local governments may
avoid the remedial regime set forth in the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act by bringing age-discrimination actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause.
Those who enjoy the complexities of federal jurisdictional
law will find at least five cases to celebrate next Term. In one of
multiple consumer-protection actions across the country alleg-
ing price-fixing by makers of liquid-crystal display (LCD) pan-
els, the Court in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.143
will be asked to resolve a circuit split on whether a state’s parens
patriae action is removable to federal court as a “mass action”
under the Class Action Fairness Act. In Atlantic Marine Con-
struction Co. v. United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas,144 the Court will consider the degree to which fed-
eral courts and litigants are bound by forum-selection agree-
ments. In Sprint Communications Co. v. Jacobs,145 the Court will
take on the task of clarifying the application of Younger absten-
tion in civil cases.146 In a sequel to Kiobel, the Court in Daim-
lerChrysler AG v. Bauman147 will determine whether a foreign
corporation may be sued in the United States under the Alien
Tort Statute based solely on the presence in this country of one
of that corporation’s subsidiaries. In Walden v. Fiore,148 the
Court will determine whether the Constitution and the general
federal-venue statute permit a Georgia police officer to be sued
in Nevada for conduct in which he allegedly engaged in Geor-
gia after confronting the plaintiffs on suspicion of drug activity
at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport.
Other issues on the Court’s docket for the coming Term
include the standing requirements for bringing a false-adver-
tising claim under the Lanham Act;149 the cognizability of dis-
parate-impact claims under the Fair Housing Act;150 the con-
ditions under which airlines and their employees enjoy immu-
nity under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act when
reporting potential security threats to the Transportation Secu-
rity Administration;151 and a trio of cases concerning the Secu-
rities Litigation Uniform Standards Act,152 among many others.
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For readers who would like to review the truly momentouscases of the Supreme Court’s last Term, I heartily recom-mend Professor Todd E. Pettys’s article, More than Mar-
riage: Civil Cases in the Supreme Court’s 2012-2013 Term, which
also appears in this issue of Court Review. During this past
Term, like the one before it, the real blockbusters were on the
civil side.  But the Court’s criminal docket was not without its
charms.  The justices wrestled with the collection of DNA evi-
dence from arrestees, canine sniffs at the front door, non-custo-
dial suspects’ silence in the face of questioning, and increased
minimum sentences based on facts not submitted to the jury.
This article reviews these and other criminal cases that may
most interest jurists and lawyers in state courts, and concludes
with a brief glimpse at the October 2013 Term.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Of all the criminal-law-related rulings this past Term, the
Fourth Amendment decisions were perhaps the most signifi-
cant.  The Court issued important holdings on collecting foren-
sic evidence (DNA and blood) without a warrant, using nar-
cotics detection dogs, and detaining residents during a warrant
search.  The decisions regarding blood draws (Missouri v.
McNeely) and detentions (Bailey v. United States) matter a lot in
day-to-day policing.  The DNA case (Maryland v. King) may
well spur state legislatures to enact or revise laws for obtaining
DNA from arrestees.  Altogether, these rulings will influence
police and courts for many years to come.
DNA, BLOOD, AND WARRANTS
In Maryland v. King,1 an important and much-awaited ruling,
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent
the government from obtaining and analyzing arrestees’ DNA.
Alonzo King was arrested for assault for allegedly menacing a
group of people with a shotgun.  At booking, jail personnel used
a cheek swab to take a DNA sample, pursuant to the provisions
of the Maryland DNA Collection Act.  The sample was analyzed,
and King’s DNA profile was uploaded into Maryland’s DNA data-
base.  It was subsequently forwarded to the national database
supervised by The FBI (CODIS), and matched to a DNA profile
from a DNA sample collected in an unsolved 2003 rape case.
King was convicted of rape, but the Maryland Court of Appeals
struck down part of the Act authorizing officers to collect DNA
from felony arrestees.  The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4
decision authored by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, and Alito.
The Court found that the process of obtaining a DNA sam-
ple was a search, but that the search was reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  The legitimate govern-
ment interests served by the Act are well-established and
include “the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and
accurate way to process and identify the persons and posses-
sions they must take into custody.”2 Justice Kennedy described
the process of obtaining a DNA sample and adding it to various
databases.  In a lengthy portion of the opinion, the majority
contended that obtaining an arrestee’s DNA is a critical part of
identifying the arrestee so that the government will know with
certainty who is in its possession, whether the arrestee poses a
danger and should (for example) not be released on bail, and
other matters.  The Court analogized to fingerprint evidence
and an old photo-based system of categorizing arrestees.  The
justices also noted the gentle process for obtaining a swab, com-
pared with a venipuncture or surgical procedure, and appeared
reassured by the protections of the Act, which requires the DNA
profile to be entered in the database only after a judicial officer
finds probable cause to detain.  Further, the DNA sample must
be destroyed if the individual is acquitted or unconditionally
pardoned.  The majority concluded that the “DNA identifica-
tion of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered
part of a routine booking procedure.”3
Justice Scalia penned the dissent, arguing that the category
of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches does not
include searches designed to serve the ordinary needs of law
enforcement.  In the view of the dissenting justices, the Mary-
land Act and the process followed in King’s case were in no way
focused upon identifying King or in serving any other adminis-
trative purpose.  The dissent is a frankly devastating rejoinder
to the claim that the evidence was obtained for identification
purposes.  The dissenters summed their position up this way:
“DNA testing does not even begin until after arraignment and
bail decisions are already made.  The samples sit in storage for
months, and take weeks to test.  When they are tested, they are
checked against” profiles in a federal database of unsolved
crimes, rather than the profiles in the database of individuals
who have been arrested and convicted, “which could be used to
identify them.”4
The dissenting justices also disagreed with the analogy to
fingerprint identification, as well as the majority’s claim that the
process of DNA testing and entry into the national registry
could take much less time in the future.  According to the dis-
senters, the question was whether King’s search was reasonable,
DNA, Dogs, the Nickel, 
and Other Curiosities:
Criminal Law Cases in the Supreme Court’s 2012-2013 Term
Charles D. Weisselberg
178 Court Review - Volume 49 
5. 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
6. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
7. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561.
8. Id. In a part of her opinion for a plurality of the Court, Justice
Sotomayor also rejected a categorical rule proposed by the Chief
Justice under which a warrantless blood draw would be permitted
if the officer could not obtain a warrant in the time it would take
to bring the suspect to a hospital or similar facility and obtain
medical assistance.  Id. at 1563-67 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Jus-
tices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Kagan). 
9. Id. at 1568 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
10. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Justices Breyer and Alito, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
11. Id. at 1570-71.
12. Id. at 1573.
13. Id. at 1574 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
14. 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013).
15. Id. at 1055.
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003).)
18. Id. at 1055-56.
not whether some hypothetical search in the future would be.  
Turning from DNA to blood, the issue in Missouri v.
McNeely5 was whether the natural metabolism of alcohol in the
blood stream amounts to a per se exigency, thus allowing offi-
cers to obtain blood samples without a warrant in all drunk-dri-
ving cases.  In a 5-4 ruling, the Court rejected the argument,
and required the government to establish exigent circumstances
on a case-by-case basis.
The majority’s opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor,
noted that a warrantless search of the person is reasonable only
if it falls within a recognized exception, such as exigent cir-
cumstances.  The Court examined its prior ruling in Schmerber
v. California,6 where a blood draw was permitted.  That case, the
majority said, fit comfortably within decisions applying the exi-
gent-circumstances exception.  A significant delay in testing
will negatively affect the probative value of the test results.
However, “it does not follow that we should part from careful
case-by-case assessment of exigency and adopt the categorical
rule proposed by the State.”7 “[W]here police officers can rea-
sonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn
without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search,
the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.”8 Justice
Kennedy joined the majority opinion but wrote separately to
say that this case did not provide an appropriate vehicle to give
greater guidance to law enforcement about the existence of exi-
gent circumstances.9
Four justices dissented in whole or in part.  The primary dis-
sent was written by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by two oth-
ers); it contended that “[a] police officer reading this Court’s
opinion would have no idea—no idea—what the Fourth
Amendment requires of him, once he decides to obtain a blood
sample from a drunk driving suspect who has refused a breath-
alyzer test.”10 The Chief Justice underscored the evanescence
of blood evidence.  The destruction of alcohol in the blood
stream “is not simply a belief. . . ; it is a biological certainty. . . .
Evidence is literally disappearing by the minute.”11 Noting that
many jurisdictions provide for electronic warrant applications,
and that there may be time to obtain a warrant in many cases,
these three Justices also rejected the State’s proposed rule.  But
they propounded a different test, providing for an exception to
the warrant requirement if an officer could reasonably conclude
that there was not time to seek and receive a warrant before
blood could be drawn, or if the officer did not receive a
response before blood could be drawn.12 Justice Thomas also
dissented.  In his view, the rapid destruction of evidence should
permit a warrantless blood draw in every situation where police
have probable cause to arrest a
drunk driver.13
THE DOGGY DUO
Two “canine sniff” cases
issued during the past Term.
The first was Florida v. Harris,14
where all members of the Court
agreed that if a dog “alert” pro-
vides probable cause to search,
the Fourth Amendment does
not require the State to present
an extensive set of records to
establish the dog’s reliability.
The case arose from a routine
traffic stop.  A sheriff’s officer
pulled over a truck, noticed that
the driver appeared nervous, and that he had an open can of
beer.  After consent to search was refused, the deputy returned
to the car with his narcotics detection dog, Aldo, who “alerted”
on the driver’s side door handle.  A search of the car did not dis-
close any of the drugs that the dog was trained to detect, but the
officer found pseudoephedrine, which is used in manufacturing
methamphetamine.  While the defendant was out on bail, he
encountered the officer and dog once more, and the dog again
“alerted” on the door. This time nothing was found.  The
Florida Supreme Court found that to demonstrate a dog’s relia-
bility and establish probable cause, the State needed to produce
more than simply the fact that the dog had been trained and
certified.  The dog’s training and certification records, experi-
ence and training of the officer handling the dog, and field per-
formance records must also be produced.15
Reversing, the Court emphasized that its prior decisions
established that probable cause is a “practical and common-sen-
sical standard,” in which one looks at the totality of the circum-
stances.16 The test “is not reducible to ‘precise definition or
quantification.’”17 Noting that the Court has “rejected rigid rules,
bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more
flexible, all-things-considered approach,” the justices unani-
mously rejected the ruling below.18 The defendant argued that
the dog had actually shown himself untrustworthy, because he
twice indicated that particular drugs were present, but they could
not be found. The Court was not persuaded, perhaps influenced
by the claim that the door had residual odor from the driver’s
hands.  Moreover, the justices were not convinced that docu-
ments such as field performance records were necessarily accu-
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Fourth Amendment,” citing Jardines).
31. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 300 P.3d 72, 78 (Kan. 2013) (officer
“affirmatively chose to conceal his identify by covering the [apart-
ment door] peephole and affirmatively positioning himself to
block the occupant’s ability to determine who was standing at the
door . . . .   ‘No customary invitation’ permits approaching some-
one’s door in this manner,” quoting Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416);
McClintock v. State, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 7124, 7 (Tex. App.
Houston 1st Dist. June 11, 2013) (dog sniff within curtilage
“exceeds the implicit license granted by custom that allows
strangers to approach a home and briefly solicit its occupants . . .”).
rate, since they would not contain
(for example) false negatives.
Harris is not of great import,
other than to signal the Court’s
current reluctance to assess the
overall reliability of narcotics
detection dogs.19 The other half
of the doggy duo is much more
significant.  
Florida v. Jardines20 presented
the question of whether a dog
sniff at a front door is a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Officers
received an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in
Jardines’s home.  Two detectives, including one with a drug-
sniffing dog, went onto the front porch of the home.  The dog,
Franky,21 sat down at the base of the front door, indicating the
strongest location for odors he was trained to detect.  On the
basis of the dog’s behavior, a detective obtained a warrant, and
a subsequent search revealed marijuana plants.  The Florida
Supreme Court found that the use of the dog was a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment that was not
supported by probable cause.  In a 5-4 decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court agreed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia drew on his opinion in
the previous Term’s blockbuster, United States v. Jones, for the
proposition that a search occurs “[w]hen ‘the Government
obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses,
papers, or effects . . . .”22 That part of Jones had garnered five
votes, but a different group of five than in Jardines. Nevertheless,
the Jardines majority found that officers were in the curtilage of
the house—“the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated
with the home’”—which enjoys protection as part of the home
itself.23 The justices determined that the implicit license typi-
cally granted to visitors to approach a home does not extend to
officers who bring a trained dog to explore the area in the hopes
of discovering incriminating evidence.  There is no customary
invitation for that act.24 The Fourth Amendment right to be free
in one’s home from unreasonable governmental intrusion
“would be of little practical value if the State’s agents could stand
in a home’s porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with
impunity.”25 Justice Kagan authored a concurrence for three of
the justices in the majority, finding in addition that the action
was a search because it infringed on a reasonable expectation of
privacy,26 a point the majority opinion did not address.
Justice Alito dissented in an opinion joined by the Chief Jus-
tice, and Justices Kennedy and Breyer.  They argued that “[t]he
law of trespass generally gives members of the public a license
to use a walkway to approach the front door of a house and to
remain there for a brief time.”27 They saw no basis to distin-
guish between welcome and unwelcome visitors, and of course
this implied license to approach the front door extends to the
police because officers are ordinarily allowed to approach a
front door, knock, and attempt to speak to an occupant.  The
detectives did not exceed the scope of this license when they
used a dog at the front door.  In addition, the dissenting justices
would find that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
with respect to odors emanating from the home that may be
detected by a person or a dog. They noted that a previous deci-
sion already rejected the claim that the use of a narcotics dog is
the same as using a thermal-imaging device.28
Jardines is important for several reasons.  Of course, it is sig-
nificant for limiting what officers may do with a narcotics detec-
tion dog.  But more generally, it is the first Supreme Court rul-
ing interpreting the landmark Jones case.  It marks something of
a shift in even Justice Scalia’s analysis of a property-based the-
ory of a search.  In Jones, Justice Scalia tied his historical analy-
sis of the Fourth Amendment to common-law trespass.29 In
Jardines, his opinion for the majority does not even contain the
word trespass, although it still takes a property-based approach.
In the wake of Jardines, some courts have analyzed whether offi-
cers were within the scope of the “license” granted to ordinary
visitors. Some courts reference the law of trespass30 while oth-
ers do not.31
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DETENTIONS DURING WARRANT SEARCHES
Over 20 years ago, the Court decided Michigan v. Summers,32
and upheld the detention of a resident during the search of his
home.  Summers was walking down his front steps when he was
detained.  The defendant in this Term’s case, Bailey v. United
States,33 was detained about a mile from his home, where officers
were about to execute a search warrant.  In a 6-3 decision
authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court determined that the
detention could not be upheld as incident to a lawful search.34
The majority found that the law-enforcement interests listed
in Summers did not support Bailey’s detention.  First, detaining
someone who has left the premises is not necessary for reasons
of officer safety; police can mitigate any risk by taking routine
precautions, such as posting someone near the door in the
event a resident returns.  Second, detention of a former occu-
pant is unnecessary to facilitate the orderly completion of the
search.  Third, detention does not serve the interest of prevent-
ing any damage to the integrity of the search.35 According to
the Court, “[t]he categorical authority to detain incident to the
execution of a search warrant must be limited to the immediate
vicinity of the premises to be searched,” and Bailey was
detained “at a point beyond any reasonable understanding of
the immediate vicinity of the premises . . . .”36 Three of the jus-
tices in the majority also joined a concurring opinion by Justice
Scalia.  They wrote separately to emphasize that Summers estab-
lished a categorical, a bright-line rule, contrary to the Court of
Appeals’ balancing approach.  To resolve the issue in this case,
“a court need ask only one question: was the person seized
within ‘the immediate vicinity of the premises to be
searched?’”37 Conducting a Summers seizure incident to a
search is not a right that the government has; it is an exception
to the rule that would otherwise make the seizure unlawful.
“Summers embodies a categorical judgment that in one narrow
circumstance—the presence of occupants during the execution
of a search warrant—seizures are reasonable despite the
absence of probable cause.”38
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, dis-
sented.  In their view, the stop and detention was reasonable
based on a variety of factors cited by the lower court, including
that the premises were subject to a valid search warrant, the
people detained were seen leaving the premises, and the deten-
tion was effected as soon as reasonably practicable.39 These jus-
tices also contended that a bright-line rule permitting the
search would be easily administered, while the majority’s
approach invites case-by-case liti-
gation over the definition of
“immediate vicinity.”40
FIFTH AMENDMENT
No Miranda cases made it onto
the docket this past Term.  The
justices issued only one Fifth
Amendment opinion, Salinas v. Texas.41 But Salinas will, in my
view, turn out to be quite significant over the long term.  It has
important implications for policing as well as for what it means
to take the nickel (assert the Fifth Amendment privilege).42
The defendant in Salinas was suspected of shooting two
brothers.  Officers came to his home, where he handed over his
shotgun and agreed to go with them to the police station for
questioning.  During a non-custodial interview, officers asked
him if his shotgun would match the shells found at the murder
scene.  Salinas did not answer and instead looked down at the
floor.  At trial, the State introduced evidence of his silence and
reaction.  In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court found no viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment, though the majority split on the
reasons.
Justice Alito delivered the judgment of the Court.  In an
opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, he
wrote that Salinas’s Fifth Amendment claim failed because he
simply remained silent and did not expressly invoke the privi-
lege.  There are several circumstances in which an individual
need not expressly invoke to avail herself of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s protections.  A defendant “need not take the stand and
assert the privilege at his own trial,”43 and Griffin v. California44
prohibits comment on the decision not to testify.  Moreover,
due to the compelling pressures of an unwarned custodial inter-
rogation, an individual need not expressly invoke.  Likewise,
the privilege need not be affirmatively asserted where there are
threats, such as the withdrawal of government benefits,45 or
where assertion itself would be incriminating.46 But the three-
justice plurality declined to create what they characterized as
another exception to the invocation requirement; among other
reasons, mere silence in the face of questioning does not put
police on notice that the privilege is itself the reason for the
decision not to answer.47 And a contrary rule “would also be
very difficult to reconcile with Berghuis v. Thompkins,” where a
defendant in custody “failed to invoke the privilege when he
refused to respond to police questioning for 2 hours and 45
Court Review - Volume 49 181
Salinas will, in
my view, turn
out to be quite
significant over
the long term.
48. Id. at 2182 (citing Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010)).
49. Id. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring).
50. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 341 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
51. Id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2186 (quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955));
id. at 2190-91.
53. Id. at 2189.
54. Id. at 2190.
55. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV.
1519, 1542-47 (2008).  Following California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.
1121 (1983), a “Beheler warning” is advice to a suspect that she is
not under arrest or that she is free leave.  This admonishment may
be considered in determining whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, a person is in custody for Miranda purposes.
56. 133 S. Ct. at 2183 (rejecting an argument that officers may unduly
pressure suspects into talking by telling them that their silence
may be used in a future prosecution, as officers do nothing wrong
when they accurately state the law) (citations omitted).
57. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
58. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
59. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
60. 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
61. Id. at 2160.  
62. Id. at 2162 (footnote omitted).
minutes” after receiving Miranda
warnings.48 Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia, con-
curred in the judgment.49 They
contended that “the Court’s deci-
sion in Griffin ‘lacks foundation
in the Constitution’s text, his-
tory, or logic’ and should not be
extended” to this case.50
Justice Breyer wrote for the
four dissenting justices.51 In
their view, the majority’s rule
undermines the Fifth Amend-
ment’s basic protections.  It has
long been held “that ‘no ritualis-
tic formula is necessary in order
to invoke the privilege,’” and Salinas was not represented by
counsel.52 Thompkins, the dissenters argued, is beside the
point, as that case concerned the admissibility of his later
speech, not comment on his silence after receiving Miranda
warnings.  And since the silence was in response to a question
aimed at determining if Salinas was guilty of murder, it would
be reasonable to infer that his silence derived from his exercise
of the privilege.53 The “need to categorize Salinas’ silence as
based on the Fifth Amendment” is supported by the predica-
ment of “forcing Salinas to choose between incrimination
through speech and incrimination through silence” and the
absence of any special reason why police had to know with cer-
tainty whether Salinas’ silence was in fact in reliance on the
Fifth Amendment.54
For police, at least, this is an important case.  Miranda warn-
ings need not be given when a suspect is interrogated but is not
in custody.  In many jurisdictions, officers have been trained in
techniques for questioning suspects, including—for example—
providing Beheler warnings, to increase the likelihood that even
interrogations in police stations might be found non-custo-
dial.55 Salinas increases the potential payoff of this approach.  If
officers are able to conduct a non-custodial interview or inter-
rogation, and a suspect does not expressly invoke, the State may
now comment on her silence.  The three-justice plurality also
suggested an additional tactic to obtain a confession: officers
might tell a non-custodial suspect that her silence may be used
against her in a future prosecution.56 By contrast, of course, the
prosecution cannot comment about silence after Miranda warn-
ings are given in a custodial interrogation, and the warnings
convey that principle.57
SIXTH AMENDMENT
The justices decided two important Sixth Amendment cases
during the last Term and ducked a third.  The most significant
of the decided cases was Alleyne v. United States, which was yet
another Apprendi holding.  The Court also addressed mistrials
and the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
RIGHT TO A JURY—APPRENDI ISSUES
Thirteen years ago, in the landmark decision in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, the Court ruled that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”58 Apprendi
held that a hate-crime allegation, which—if found to be true—
would increase the maximum possible sentence, is essentially an
element of the crime and must be submitted to a jury.  Two
years later, the Court decided Harris v. United States,59 deter-
mining that allegations that increase the minimum sentence
need not be submitted to the jury.  In this Term’s important case,
Alleyne v. United States,60 the justices overruled Harris, finding
no basis to distinguish facts that increase the minimum term of
a sentence and those that increase the maximum.
Allen Alleyne was charged with using or carrying a firearm in
relation to a crime of violence pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§924(c)(1)(A).  The offense carried a five-year mandatory min-
imum term.  The mandatory minimum term increased to seven
years if the firearm was “brandished.”  At trial, the jury indicated
on the verdict form that he had used or carried a firearm but did
not make any finding that the firearm was brandished.  At sen-
tencing, the District Court ruled that the evidence supported a
finding of brandishing, and Alleyne received seven years.  In a 5-
4 decision, the Court vacated the sentence on that count.
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas held that “[i]t is
impossible to dissociate the floor of the sentencing range from
the penalty affixed to the crime. . . .[C]riminal statutes have
long specified both the floor and ceiling of sentencing ranges,
which is evidence that both define the legally prescribed
penalty.”61 While the majority acknowledged the dissenters’
argument that the seven-year sentence for the §924(c) count
was authorized by the jury’s verdict, they found it to be “beside
the point.”62 “When a finding of fact alters the legally pre-
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scribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily
forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submit-
ted to the jury.  It is no answer to say that defendant could have
received the same sentence with or without that fact.”  Harris,
the Court held, was inconsistent with Apprendi, and was over-
ruled.63 Justice Breyer concurred and explained that he had
previously accepted Harris’s holding because he was not ready
to accept the rule in Apprendi. But now, over a decade later, “the
law should no longer tolerate the anomaly that the
Apprendi/Harris distinction creates.”64 Justice Sotomayor wrote
separately to explain why Harris should be overruled despite
the principles of stare decisis.65
The Chief Justice penned the primary dissent, arguing that
“[o]ur holdings that a judge may not sentence a defendant to
more than the jury has authorized properly preserve the jury
right as a guard against judicial overreaching.”66 Where, as
here, a sentence is imposed within the range authorized by the
jury’s verdict, there is no such risk of judicial overreaching.  The
jury’s verdict authorized the judge to impose a seven-year sen-
tence for precisely the reason he imposed it.  The Sixth Amend-
ment does not demand more.67 Justice Alito dissented sepa-
rately, arguing that while stare decisis is not an inexorable com-
mand, “[i]f the Court is of a mind to reconsider existing prece-
dent, a prime candidate should be Apprendi . . . .”68
Alleyne is an important ruling, which state courts are begin-
ning to address.69 It may be worth noting that the federal courts
have already reached different outcomes on whether resentenc-
ing is required when an Alleyne error is found.  Several circuits
have found the error to be harmless, but others have automati-
cally reversed.70
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A Michigan statute defines the offense of burning a dwelling
house.  Even though the evidence suggested that the defendant
in Evans v. Michigan71 had burned an occupied house, he was
tried on charges of burning “other real property,” which is set
out in a different section of the statute.  At the conclusion of the
prosecution’s case, Evans moved for a directed verdict of acquit-
tal on the theory that an essential element of the offense was
that the structure was not a dwelling house, and the State had
failed to meet its burden.  The trial court granted the motion.
As it turned out, the trial judge misinterpreted state law.  Burn-
ing “other real property” is a lesser included offense, and the
State is not required to disprove
the greater offense.  Does the
Double Jeopardy Clause pro-
hibit retrial?  In an 8-1 decision,
the Supreme Court said it does.
Justice Sotomayor’s majority
opinion is a primer on long-
standing principles of double-
jeopardy law.  The Double Jeop-
ardy Clause forbids a retrial fol-
lowing a court-decreed acquittal
even if it is based on an erro-
neous foundation.  A mistaken
acquittal is still an acquittal.  It
is unreviewable whether a judge
directs a jury to return a verdict of not guilty or enters the ver-
dict herself.  The acquittal precludes retrial even if it is based on
an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, a mistaken under-
standing of the evidence required for conviction, or a miscon-
struction of the statute defining the requirements to convict.
While there may be a retrial following a procedural dismissal as
opposed to a substantive ruling, here the trial court evaluated
the State’s evidence.72 The Court’s prior decisions “all instruct
that an acquittal due to insufficient evidence precludes retrial,
whether the Court’s evaluation of the evidence was ‘correct or
not.’”73 The majority rejected the State’s arguments for a differ-
ent outcome in the case at bench; among other things, it was
unpersuaded that the erroneous addition of an extraneous ele-
ment of the offense was any different than a simple misinter-
pretation or misconstruction of the statute. And it did not mat-
ter that the acquittal was sought by the defendant.  Justice Alito
was the sole dissenter.74
SPEEDY TRIAL
Finally, in Boyer v. Louisiana,75 the Court dismissed the peti-
tion for writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.  The Court
had accepted the case to determine whether the State’s failure to
fund counsel for an indigent defendant for five years should be
weighed against the State for speedy trial purposes.  Justice
Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurred in the
order of dismissal, saying that the record did not show that
much of the delay was caused by the State, and thus review had
been granted on the basis of a mistaken factual premise.76 Four
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justices dissented.  They con-
cluded that delay resulting from a
State’s failure to fund an indigent’s
defense should weigh against the
State and that any remaining fac-
tual issues could be resolved on
remand.77
RETROACTIVITY AND THE EX
POST FACTO CLAUSE
The Court decided three cases
that relate to the retroactive appli-
cation of law.  The retroactivity
issues were assessed under different legal principles—habeas
doctrine, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Due Process
Clause—but it seems appropriate to consider them together.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL/ADVICE ABOUT IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES
Three Terms ago, the Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky,78 and
held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel includes the right to advice on the immigration conse-
quences of a guilty plea, at least where the consequences of the
conviction are clear.  Lower courts split on the question whether
Padilla applies retroactively.  In Chaidez v. United States,79 the
justices found that the decision was not applicable to people
whose convictions became final before Padilla was announced.
Writing for six members of the Court, Justice Kagan analyzed
the retroactivity question under the framework of Teague v.
Lane.80 A decision is not applied retroactively if it is a “new
rule,” meaning one which “breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation” on the government.81 A case sets forth a new rule “if
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant’s conviction became final.”82 Padilla, said the Court,
would not have created a new rule had it only applied Strickland
v. Washington’s83 ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard to a
new factual situation.  But Padilla did more.  It “considered a
threshold question: Was advice about deportation ‘categorically
removed’ from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel because it involved only a ‘collateral consequence’ of a con-
viction, rather than a component of the criminal sentence?”84
Padilla’s holding about the former distinction between direct and
collateral consequences points to the conclusion that it
announced a new rule.85 Justice Thomas concurred in the judg-
ment only, maintaining that Padilla was wrongly decided.86
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg dissented.  In their view,
“Padilla is built squarely on the foundation laid out by Strick-
land” and “relied upon controlling precedent.”87 The dissent-
ing justices were not persuaded that Padilla’s discussion of
direct and collateral consequences indicated that it was estab-
lishing a new rule.  They contended that the Padilla Court said
it had never previously distinguished between direct and col-
lateral consequences in defining the scope of effective assis-
tance of counsel, and the Padilla majority expressly declined to
consider whether that distinction was appropriate in that
case.88 The dissenters argued that “[w]hat truly appears to
drive the majority’s analysis is its sense that Padilla occasioned
a serious disruption in lower court decisional reasoning. . . . But
the fact that a decision was perceived as momentous or conse-
quential, particularly by those who disagreed with it, does not
control in the Teague analysis.”89
EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
The petitioner in Peugh v. United States90 committed bank
fraud in 1999 and 2000.  In 2010, he received a sentence of 70
months in federal prison.  Peugh claimed that his sentence vio-
lated the Ex Post Facto Clause91 because the judge applied the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines range in effect at the time of sen-
tencing (70-87 months) rather than the range in effect when
the offense was committed (30-37 months).  The Ex Post Facto
Clause prohibits—among other things—laws “that change[]
the punishment, and inflict[] a greater punishment, than the
law annexed to the crime, when committed.”92 Did the Guide-
lines amendment accomplish such a change, inasmuch as the
Court decided in United States v. Booker93 that the Guidelines
are advisory, not mandatory? In a 5-4 opinion written by Jus-
tice Sotomayor, the Court said yes.
Critical to the majority was the understanding that it is not
necessary for a law to increase the defendant’s maximum eligi-
ble sentence in order to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Nor
does the fact that the sentencing court has a degree of discretion
defeat such a claim, though the possibility must be more than
mere speculation.  “The touchstone” of the inquiry is whether
the change in law “presents a ‘sufficient risk of increasing the
measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.’”94 Jus-
tice Sotomayor explained that while the Guidelines are advi-
sory, the sentencing judge uses the range as the starting point in
the analysis.  “That a district court may ultimately sentence a
given defendant outside the Guidelines range does not deprive
the Guidelines of force as the framework for sentencing.”95
Moreover, the significance of the Guidelines is underscored by
the fact that appellate review for reasonableness uses the Guide-
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lines as a benchmark, and a mistake in calculating the Guide-
lines is procedural error.  Contrary to the government’s argu-
ments, the majority considered the Guidelines to have more
force than merely nonbinding policy statements.  In the end,
the Court saw this case as closest to Miller v. Florida,96 where a
change in Florida’s guidelines scheme was held to violate the
Clause. Florida’s guidelines provided a presumptive sentencing
range, and clear and convincing reasons had to be given for a
departure from that range.  The majority in Peugh concluded
that applying the amended Guidelines to the defendant violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause.97
Justice Thomas wrote the dissent, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justices Scalia and Alito.  They countered the majority’s
claim that the Guidelines were more like binding law because
an incorrect calculation is reversible error.  In the dissenters’
view, “the fact that courts must give due consideration to the
recommendation expressed in the correct Guidelines does not
mean that the Guidelines constrain the district court’s discre-
tion to impose an appropriate sentence; it simply means that
district courts must consider the correct variables before exer-
cising their discretion.”98 Moreover, “[i]t is difficult to see how
an advisory Guideline, designed to lead courts to impose sen-
tences more in line with fixed statutory objectives, could ever
constitute an ex post facto violation.”99 Writing for himself in
another part of his opinion, Justice Thomas contended that the
opinion also demonstrated the unworkability of the Court’s ex
post facto jurisprudence, and that the Court should return to
the original meaning of the Clause.  He argued that the justices
should not adhere to prior cases that find a violation when there
is a sufficient “risk” of an increased sentence.100
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE—RETROACTIVITY
While the Ex Post Facto Clause does not measure the retroac-
tive application of a judicial decision, the Due Process Clause
does.  In Metrish v. Lancaster,101 a federal habeas corpus peti-
tioner challenged the retroactive application of a decision from
the Michigan Supreme Court.  Beginning in 1973, Michigan’s
intermediate appellate courts began recognizing a diminished-
capacity defense to negate the mens rea element of first-degree
murder.  In 1975, the Michigan Legislature passed a law that set
forth the requirements of a defense based upon mental illness or
mental retardation. The 1975 Act was amended in 1994, to clar-
ify who bore the burden of proof.  In 2001, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that defendants could not raise diminished
capacity, as it was not included within Michigan’s comprehen-
sive statutory scheme.  Lancaster’s offense took place in 1993. At
his trial, the judge applied the 2001 decision retroactively and
denied Lancaster’s request to present evidence of diminished
capacity.  In a unanimous opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court found that Lancaster was
not entitled to habeas corpus
relief.
The Court compared Lan-
caster’s claim to the two primary
precedents, Bouie v. City of
Columbia102 and Rogers v. Ten-
nessee.103 Bouie was not on
point; there, a decision of the
South Carolina Supreme Court
was retroactively applied to
make an act criminal that was
otherwise not proscribed.  Rogers was closer. In that case, the
Tennessee Supreme Court retroactively abolished the common-
law “year-and-a-day rule” in murder cases. The decision not to
adhere to the rule in Rogers’s case did not violate the Due
Process Clause principle of fair warning because the rule was
widely viewed as an outdated relic, and had only a tenuous
foothold in Tennessee.  Lancaster’s claim “is arguably less weak”
than that rejected in Rogers, since diminished capacity was not
an outdated relic and has been acknowledged repeatedly by the
Michigan Court of Appeals.104 However, Lancaster could not
meet the demanding standards required for federal habeas cor-
pus relief.  He would need to establish an unreasonable appli-
cation of federal law.  And “[d]istinguishing Rogers, a case in
which we rejected a due process claim, . . . does little to bolster
Lancaster’s argument that the [state court’s] decision unreason-
ably applied clearly established federal law . . . This Court has
never found a due process violation in circumstances remotely
resembling Lancaster’s case . . . .”105
DUE PROCESS—BURDEN OF PROOF
The Court also decided an interesting case about the assign-
ment of the burden of proof.  The defendant in Smith v. United
States106 was charged with conspiracy and other crimes relating
to his alleged role in a drug distribution organization.  He
claimed that the conspiracy counts were barred by the five-year
statute of limitations, pointing to the fact that he was in prison
on other charges for the last six years of the charged conspiracy.
The trial court instructed the jury that the burden is on the
defendant to prove withdrawal from a conspiracy by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.  On appeal, he argued that it was the
government’s burden to disprove a defensive withdrawal before
the limitations period.  In an opinion by Justice Scalia for a
unanimous Court, the justices disagreed.
The opinion rehearsed the relevant basic principles.  While
the Due Process Clause assigns the government the burden of
proving every fact necessary to constitute the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative
While the Ex Post
Facto Clause does
not measure 
the retroactive
application of a
judicial decision,
the Due Process
Clause does.
Court Review - Volume 49 185
107. Id. at 720.
108. Id. at 719.
109. 133 S. Ct. 2139 (2013).  Disclosure:  I joined an amicus curiae
brief submitted on behalf of a number of law professors in this
case. 
110. I apologize to readers if I have excluded some notable decisions.
A few close calls included United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct.
2496 (2013) (the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause
affords Congress the power to require federal sex offenders to
register, even if they completed their sentences prior to the Act;
Kebodeaux did not, however, address any ex post facto claims)
and Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (charac-
terization of state offenses for the purposes of the federal Armed
Career Criminal Act).  
111. 133 S. Ct. at 2144.
112. Id. at 2143 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h)).  See also Fed. R.
Crim P. 52(a) (“Any error  . . . that does not affect substantial
rights must be disregarded.”).
113. Davila, 133 S. Ct. at 2149 (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 2150 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Justice Thomas).
115. 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).
defenses is not constitutionally
required.  The prosecution is fore-
closed from shifting the burden to
the defendant only when an affir-
mative defense negates an element
of crime.  However, where an affir-
mative defense instead excuses
conduct that would otherwise be
punishable, but does not negate
any of the elements of the offense
itself, the government does not
have a constitutional duty to overcome the defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.  The Court found that withdrawal did not
negate an element of Smith’s conspiracy crime.  “Commission
of the crime within the statute-of-limitations period is not an ele-
ment of the conspiracy offense.”107 Thus, “[w]ithdrawal termi-
nates the defendant’s liability for postwithdrawal acts of his co-
conspirators, but he remains guilty of conspiracy.”108 In
another part of the opinion, the Court noted that Congress was
free to alter the assignment of proof with respect to the exis-
tence or nonexistence of withdrawal.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
One federal criminal appeal, United States v. Davila,109 may
be of interest.110 While it primarily involves the construction of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, it also briefly discusses
the sorts of errors that are considered to be structural.
The defendant in Davila was dissatisfied with his legal rep-
resentation, and complained that his attorney had advised him
to plead guilty.  In what all parties later agreed was a clear vio-
lation of Rule 11(c)(1), the Magistrate Judge essentially urged
him to plead guilty and cooperate with the government in this
or other cases.  He said that to obtain the sentence reduction for
“acceptance of responsibility,” which is regularly given defen-
dants who plead guilty, Davila had to “come to the cross.”111
Davila pleaded guilty several months later. The Supreme Court
unanimously held that any Rule 11 violation of this type is
assessed for harmless error; reversal is not automatic.  
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg first noted that Rule
11(h) specifically provides that a variance from the rule “is
harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights.”112 The
justices rejected the claim that this type of violation, which
occurs before a defendant decides whether to plead guilty,
should be treated differently than the sort of procedural errors
that can occur during a plea colloquy.  Under the plain language
of Rule 11, and consistent with the Advisory Committee’s com-
mentary, both are amenable to review for harmless error.
“Structural error” refers to a very limited class of errors that
“trigger automatic reversal because they undermine the fairness
of a criminal proceeding as a whole,” and this error does not fit
within that category.113 The Court remanded for the lower
courts to assess the error in light of the full record.  Justices
Scalia and Thomas concurred.  They agreed that a defendant
must be prejudiced to obtain relief, but would have reached that
conclusion by applying the plain language of Rule 11, without
reference to the Advisory Committee’s comments.114
HABEAS CORPUS
There are several noteworthy federal habeas cases from the
last Term.  The Court took on the question of competency and
habeas, as well as a more ordinary set of cases concerning pro-
cedural default and habeas practice under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
RIGHT TO COMPETENCE
Does a federal habeas corpus petitioner, who is challenging
a state capital conviction, have a right to stay the habeas pro-
ceeding if he is not competent to proceed?  In Ryan v. Gonzales
and Tibbals v. Carter,115 the Court said no.
The case arose from two separate habeas corpus petitions,
one in the Sixth Circuit and one in the Ninth.  The Courts of
Appeals both stayed the proceedings, albeit on the basis of dif-
ferent statutory provisions. The Court’s unanimous opinion,
written by Justice Thomas, found no statutory basis for a stay.
There is no right to competence in the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3599,
the statute that provides federal habeas petitioners on death
row the right to federally funded counsel.  Nor may such a right
be implied from the statutory right to counsel—that would not
be consistent with the Court’s constitutional precedents.  An
incompetent defendant may not be tried, but that protection
stems from the Due Process Clause.  The Court has never said
it is derived from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Fur-
ther, a right to competence cannot be found in 18 U.S.C. §
4241, which generally applies only to federal criminal defen-
dants (not state defendants who become federal habeas peti-
tioners).  The Court did, however, note that District Courts
have discretion to grant stays.  In one of the cases, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a stay, because all
of the claims were record-based or resolvable as a matter of law,
irrespective of the petitioner’s competence.  In the other case,
the Court remanded to determine whether there is a likelihood
that the petitioner will regain competence in the foreseeable
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future and whether the claim could substantially benefit from
his assistance.
What is most interesting about this opinion is how it con-
ceives the role of the federal courts in capital habeas cases.
“Given the backward-looking, record-based nature of most fed-
eral habeas proceedings, counsel can generally provide effective
representation to a habeas petitioner regardless of the peti-
tioner’s competence.”116 Citing Cullen v. Pinholster117 and Har-
rington v. Richter,118 the justices emphasized that review is usu-
ally limited to the record that was before the state court.119
“Attorneys are quite capable of reviewing the state-court record,
identifying legal errors, and marshaling relevant arguments,
even without their clients’ assistance.”120
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY
ACT/PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
A few procedural default cases are worth a brief mention.  In
McQuiggin v. Perkins,121 the Court ruled 5-4 that “actual inno-
cence,” if proved, can provide a gateway to federal habeas cor-
pus review, even if the petitioner failed to file her petition
within AEDPA’s one-year limitations period.  Trevino v. Thaler122
provided an opportunity to revisit Martinez v. Ryan,123 which
was decided last Term. In Martinez, a state law required a claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to be raised in an initial-
review collateral proceeding (instead of on direct review), and
the Court found that ineffective assistance of state counsel in
the collateral proceeding may excuse the failure to raise the
claim about trial counsel.  The Trevino Court examined Texas’s
procedural system and determined that it does not offer most
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal.  In a 5-4 rul-
ing, the justices found no distinction between (1) a system
“that denies permission to raise the claim on direct appeal” and
(2) a system “that in theory grants permission but, as a matter
of procedural design and systemic operation, denies a mean-
ingful opportunity to do so . . . .”124
The Court also addressed the circumstance in which a state
criminal defendant attempts to raise a federal claim and a state
court rules against the defendant in an opinion that addresses
some issues but does not expressly address the federal claim.  In
Johnson v. Williams, the justices held that a federal habeas court
“must presume (subject to rebuttal) that the federal claim was
adjudicated on the merits.”125 The justices were unanimous in
finding that the presumption was not rebutted simply because
the state court addressed some but not all of the claims.  The
opinion noted that “it is not
the uniform practice of busy
state courts to discuss sepa-
rately every single claim to
which a defendant makes
even a passing reference.”126
While the Court found that
the presumption was not
rebutted, it also rejected the
State’s argument that the pre-
sumption should be made
irrebuttable.  Justice Scalia
concurred, arguing that the
presumption should only be
rebuttable by a showing,
based on the text of the
court’s order or upon practice
in the jurisdiction, that the
judgment did not purport to decide the federal question.127
Finally, during the 2011-12 Term, the Court granted certio-
rari and summarily reversed in six habeas corpus cases.  As I
wrote a year ago, the justices did so to underscore AEDPA’s
demanding standards.128 This year, the justices continued the
practice, but with fewer cases—three—all from the Ninth Cir-
cuit.  In Marshall v. Rodgers,129 they reversed the Circuit’s grant
of habeas relief, finding that there is no clearly established Fed-
eral law, as determined by the Supreme Court, with respect to a
criminal defendant’s ability to reassert his right to counsel once
he has validly waived it.  The Court criticized the Court of
Appeals for its “mistaken belief that circuit precedent may be
used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court
jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that this Court has not
announced.”130 Another summary reversal came in Nevada v.
Jackson,131 where the state courts excluded evidence of a rape
victim’s prior uncorroborated allegations of rape by the defen-
dant, largely because the accused did not give notice of his
intent to introduce extrinsic evidence.  While it is well-estab-
lished, as a general principle, that a defendant has a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense, “[n]o decision of
this Court clearly establishes that this notice requirement is
unconstitutional.”132 Finally, in Ryan v. Schad,133 the justices
ruled that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in failing
to issue its mandate after Supreme Court review was denied; the
Circuit sua sponte sought to reconsider an argument it had pre-
viously rejected.
In McQuiggin v.
Perkins, the Court
ruled 5-4 that
“actual innocence,”
if proved, can 
provide a gateway
to federal habeas
corpus review,
even if the 
petitioner failed 
to [timely] file 
her petition . . . .
Court Review - Volume 49 187
134. Kansas v. Cheever, No. 12-609.
135. Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464.
136. Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490.
137. Burt v. Titlow, No. 12-414.
138. Fernandez v. California, No. 12-7822.
A LOOK AHEAD
As this article goes to press, the Court’s 2013 Term has just
begun.  It is still quite early for a full preview, but there are a few
cases to watch.  The justices will consider whether the Fifth
Amendment is violated when a State uses a court-ordered men-
tal evaluation to rebut a capital defendant’s showing about his
mental state;134 whether the government can obtain an ex parte
order to freeze assets that a defendant needs to retain counsel,
and not provide a pretrial, adversarial hearing on the underly-
ing charges;135 if officers who receive an anonymous tip about a
drunk or reckless driver need to corroborate dangerous driving
before stopping the vehicle;136 what standards and relief are
appropriate for a claim that a defendant would have pled guilty
but for ineffective assistance of counsel;137 and whether a resi-
dent must be personally present to object when officers ask a
cotenant for consent to search a dwelling, or whether a previ-
ous objection remains effective.138 It should be another inter-
esting year.
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Footnotes
1. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.3 (2011). Twenty-seven
states have adopted the language of Rule 2.3 or substantially sim-
ilar language. 
Over the past three decades, court leaders across thecountry have taken aggressive steps to confront racialbias in the courts. Recent efforts include in-depth
judicial education and training about how an individual’s
unconscious attitudes (including culturally learned associa-
tions or generalizations that we tend to think of as stereo-
types) introduce unjustified assumptions about other people
and related evidence that can distort a person’s judgment and
behavior. This phenomenon is now referred to as implicit bias
to differentiate it from explicit or intentional bias. Judicial-
education programs focus on raising judicial awareness about
implicit bias and introducing techniques that judges may use
to help minimize the impact of implicit bias on judicial deci-
sion making. 
Despite high levels of interest and genuine commitment to
racial fairness in the justice system, disparate treatment of racial
minorities persists and pervades all stages of the criminal jus-
tice process. Jury trials are a particularly troubling component
of the justice system with regard to the potential for racial bias.
Courts have extremely limited opportunities to educate jurors
about the pernicious effects of complex psychological phenom-
ena like implicit bias and how these implicit forms of bias may
distort jurors’ interpretation of trial evidence. Jurors are ran-
domly selected from the local community. Other than statutory
qualifications such as U.S. citizenship, age (adults 18 or older),
and the ability to speak and understand English, state courts
have no educational, occupational, or personal experience
requirements to be eligible for jury service. Most jurors in this
country serve only for the duration of the trial (typically two to
three days) and then are released from service. No time is avail-
able during this short period to provide the type of in-depth
education on implicit bias that judges and court staff may
receive. Instead, judges and lawyers are increasingly looking to
existing opportunities within the jury-selection and trial period
(e.g., juror orientation, voir dire, jury instructions) in which to
inform jurors about the propensity of implicit bias to affect
decision making and to provide concrete strategies to minimize
the impact of implicit bias on jury verdicts.
This article focuses on several of these interventions and the
factors that may increase or undermine their effectiveness. Most
Americans are aware of the existence of explicit bias and its
effects on decision making generally, but implicit bias is still a
relatively new concept about which many people in the justice
system are unaware. The first section of this article discusses
the difference between explicit bias and implicit bias and why
contemporary researchers have become more convinced that
much of the disparity in legal outcomes for African-Americans
compared to whites is likely due to implicit bias. We then
describe different interventions that have been proposed to
reduce the impact of implicit bias, and findings from empirical
research about their effectiveness. One complication of these
interventions is that some otherwise well-intentioned
approaches can provoke a backlash effect in which the individ-
uals exposed to the intervention are actually more likely to
make judgments or behave in ways that manifest prejudice. In
the context of administering these interventions with trial
jurors, there are a number of pros and cons, many of which
involve purely logistical concerns. We conclude with an update
about interventions that are currently being tried, including a
pilot test of an implicit-bias jury instruction. 
THE IMPACT OF IMPLICIT BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Judges, lawyers, and court staff have long recognized that
explicit, or consciously endorsed, racial prejudices have no
place in the American justice system. The Code of Judicial Con-
duct in most states expressly prohibits judges from engaging in
bias, prejudice, or harassment on the basis of race, gender, eth-
nicity, or other factors, and the code even extends the prohibi-
tion to court employees over which the judges have control and
to lawyers appearing in cases before them.1 In fact, most judi-
cial-performance evaluations include measures of judicial
impartiality as a major focus. The underlying justification for
this prohibition is that discriminatory speech or behavior
undermines public perceptions of judicial impartiality and
competence. In contemporary society, most people recognize
that explicit racial bias is normatively bad, and they make
efforts to suppress biased behaviors or speech, even if they con-
sciously recognize that they have those attitudes. 
What often surprises members of the court community and
other professionals is that more subtle biases or prejudices can
operate automatically, without awareness, intent, or conscious
control. Personal attitudes and acquired knowledge often help
individuals function more efficiently by making it easier for the
brain to recognize and respond quickly to new people or situa-
tions. But some attitudes, especially racial and cultural stereo-
types, distort decision making by unfairly influencing judg-
ments about others. Although explicit or consciously endorsed
racial prejudices in contemporary American society may be on
the decline, this subtler form of implicit racial bias persists.
Over the past few decades, a number of specialized tests have
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been developed to help researchers identify, measure, and study
implicit forms of bias. One of the most popular is the Implicit
Association Test (IAT), developed by researchers in the mid-
1990s at Yale University and the University of Washington. The
IAT operates under a basic premise of human cognition that
when an idea is consistent with a person’s attitudes or cultural
understanding, he or she will be able to mentally associate con-
cepts related to that idea more quickly and easily than if the
idea is inconsistent with a person’s attitudes or cultural under-
standing. In an early version of the IAT, for example,
researchers measured the amount of time it took people to asso-
ciate pictures or words representing flowers or insects with pos-
itive attributes (“good”) and with negative attributes (“bad”) by
hitting right or left keys on a computer keyboard. Because flow-
ers are generally viewed as intrinsically good and insects as
intrinsically bad (or at least significantly less good), most were
able to hit the keys associating flowers and words indicating
positive attributes, and insects and words indicating negative
attributes, much faster and with fewer errors than when they
asked to associate flowers with words indicating negative attrib-
utes or insects and words indicating positive attributes.2 The
difference in the amount of time and the number of errors
reflects the strength of the person’s preference for flowers over
insects. Interestingly, young boys and entomologists tended to
show weaker preferences for flowers over insects compared to
young girls and people who do not study insects professionally.3
This pattern of stronger preferences for more culturally familiar
and socially and individually learned concepts has been found
to be consistent for IAT tests measuring implicit biases based on
race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, religion, disabil-
ity, body weight, and other characteristics developed and
employed over the past 15 years. To try an Implicit Association
Test, go to www.implicit.harvard.edu. 
A large body of empirical literature now documents the exis-
tence of implicit biases and their behavioral implications. One
recent meta-analysis of 122 research reports found implicit
biases to be valuable, independent predictors of social behavior
and judgment.4 Implicit racial bias is the most studied type of
implicit bias. Research shows that implicit racial bias can pre-
dict the quality of social interactions and decision-making out-
comes in a variety of contexts, including voting, hiring, perfor-
mance assessment, budget setting, policing, and medical treat-
ment.5 In the context of the American justice system,
researchers now point to linkages between implicit racial bias
and disparities in detention
decisions, jury verdicts, capital
punishment, and other sen-
tencing outcomes.6
Research on judicial deci-
sion making suggests that
judges are affected by implicit
bias in ways similar to the gen-
eral population. In one study of
actual trial judges in three jurisdictions, white judges showed
strong implicit attitudes favoring whites over blacks (consistent
with studies of implicit bias in the general population).7 The
judges were presented with three vignettes, two of which did
not identify the defendant’s race but some of which included
words designed to trigger an association with African-Ameri-
cans (e.g., Harlem, dreadlocks). The third vignette explicitly
identified the defendant as white or black. The judges were
asked to recommend a judgment on guilt, to share their confi-
dence in that judgment, and to predict the defendant’s likeli-
hood of future recidivism. Interestingly, judges did not differ in
their judgments in the first two vignettes based solely on
whether the vignette included cues regarding race, but the
judges’ Race IAT was a marginally significant predictor of the
harshness of the sentence. Judges whose Race IAT indicated a
preference for whites over blacks were more likely to convict
the defendant, had greater confidence in that judgment, and
believed the likelihood of recidivism to be higher than judges
whose Race IAT indicated a preference for blacks over whites.
In the third vignette, judges with greater implicit bias against
blacks convicted black defendants at the same rate as white
defendants, but judges with greater implicit bias in favor of
blacks convicted black defendants less frequently than they did
white defendants. 
Studies of juror decision making also demonstrate the
impact of implicit bias on judgments. Levinson and Young, for
example, conducted a mock-jury experiment in which mock
jurors studied 20 pieces of trial evidence including photographs
of a crime scene, one of which was a surveillance camera pho-
tograph featuring a masked gunman whose hand and forearm
were visible. Half the cases showed light skin on the gunman
and half showed dark skin.8 This subtle manipulation of skin
color produced significantly different results in jurors’ confi-
dence in their verdict. On a scale of 1 (not at all guilty) to 100
(absolutely guilty), jurors who viewed the dark-skinned gun-
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man’s photograph rated the
defendant’s guilt at 66.97 on
average compared to 56.37 for
jurors who viewed the light-
skinned gunman’s photograph,
suggesting that skin color
affected how jurors perceived
and interpreted the trial evi-
dence. Other measures of
explicit racial bias were unre-
lated to study findings. 
Eberhardt and colleagues
investigated the extent to
which capital felony defen-
dants with stereotypically
black facial features are more
likely to be sentenced to death
than defendants without such features.9 Using a database of
death-eligible cases in Philadelphia that advanced to the
penalty phase between 1979 and 1999, the researchers identi-
fied 44 cases in which a black defendant was convicted of mur-
dering a white victim. They then obtained photographs of these
defendants and had neutral observers rate each defendant’s
looks on a scale of 1 (not at all stereotypically black) through
11 (extremely stereotypical). After controlling for nonracial fac-
tors known to influence sentencing,10 they found that defen-
dants who were rated as having less stereotypically black fea-
tures were sentenced to death in 24.4% of the cases whereas
defendants who were rated as appearing more stereotypically
black were sentenced to death in 57.5% of the cases. These find-
ings are consistent with previous research that people associate
black physical traits with criminality.
Employing the same methodology, Eberhardt and colleagues
also examined death-penalty rates in cases in which a black
defendant was convicted of murdering a black victim, but they
found no significant difference based on stereotypically black
appearances. Noting that juries may view black-on-white
crimes as intergroup conflict, rather than interpersonal conflict
involved in black-on-black crimes, they concluded that juries
may use physical appearance as a powerful cue to in determin-
ing whether a defendant deserves to die.
These studies and others11 demonstrate that racial biases in
legal decision making often arise in ways not easily or consis-
tently explained by traditional factors such as trial participant
demographic characteristics. In the discrete area of juror deci-
sion making, there is little evidence to suggest a straightfor-
ward, simple relationship between defendant race and juror
verdict preferences. Mock-juror studies such as the ones dis-
cussed here show some evidence of in-group biases,12 but stud-
ies that focus on the decision making of actual jurors in actual
trials find that the relationship between juror and defendant
race accounted for only a very small amount of the variance in
jury verdicts. Strength of evidence is generally the overwhelm-
ing predictor. Garvey and colleagues, for example, examined
decision making by more than 3,000 jurors in nearly 400 non-
capital felony trials in four jurisdictions.13 Only in the D.C.
Superior Court did the defendant’s race affect juror’s first votes
during deliberations, but even this relationship did not survive
into the juries’ final verdicts. Strength of the evidence, includ-
ing the credibility of police testimony, was the strongest factor
related to final verdicts.14
Similarly, Visher conducted 90-minute in-person interviews
with 331 jurors from 38 forcible-sexual-assault trials to exam-
ine the effects of juror characteristics, defendant and victim
characteristics, and evidentiary factors on juror decision mak-
ing.15 She found that juror characteristics accounted for only
2% of the variance in jury verdicts, and defendant and victim
characteristics accounted for only 8% of the variance. In con-
trast, evidentiary factors, especially the use of force and physi-
cal evidence, accounted for 34% of the variance. These findings
point away from strict demographic explanations for racial dis-
parities in legal decision making and toward a more complex,
nuanced alternative: one that explores how the decision maker’s
attitudes and cognitive schemas inform the perception and
interpretation of a host of evidentiary factors critical to fair legal
judgment.
PROMISING STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING IMPLICIT
BIAS
Social scientists have made great strides in recent years to
identify effective (and ineffective) interventions for combating
more insidious forms of racial bias. To reduce the effects of
implicit forms of bias in judgment and behavior, several inter-
ventions have shown promise. We discuss a few of these in turn.
EDUCATION INTERVENTIONS 
In general, basic education about the existence of implicit
forms of bias and how these can manifest in judgment is an
important first step. Personal awareness of one’s own potential
for any type of cognitive bias is necessary before an individual
is capable of engaging in efforts to correct for it. Although sim-
ply being aware of the potential for racial bias may prompt
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some individuals to pursue corrective action, it is not sufficient
to ensure that debiasing efforts consistently reduce or prevent
expressions of implicit bias.16 Individuals must understand the
nature of implicit bias—what it is and how it can affect judg-
ment—to increase the likelihood that the corrective efforts they
engage in are effective.17 And they must also possess the moti-
vation to fully implement such debiasing efforts. 
In framing an educational message on implicit bias, how-
ever, the appeal used has important ramifications. For example,
one set of studies has shown that some types of individuals are
angered and feel threatened by external pressure to comply
with mandatory nondiscrimination standards. 18 When away
from the watchful eye of the authority figure setting the stan-
dards for compliance, these individuals are more likely to
engage in biased decision making, presumably in attempts to
“reassert their personal freedom.”19 Thus if an authority designs
the educational message to pressure individuals to comply with
social or institutional standards for racial fairness, this extrinsic
motivation to regulate prejudice can incite hostility and gener-
ate backlash that may increase expressions of racial prejudice.
Legault and colleagues showed that exposing individuals to
educational messages designed to compel adherence to racial
fairness generated more explicit prejudice (in the form of self-
reported racial attitudes) and implicit prejudice (in the form of
reaction time measures like the IAT) than a no-intervention
alternative. That approach shows that forced-compliance inter-
ventions can actually increase expressions of prejudice over
doing nothing.20 In contrast, Legault and colleagues also found
that educational messages designed to inform and appeal to
personal standards for egalitarianism (i.e., to generate intrinsic
motivation to regulate prejudice) reduced expressions of
explicit and implicit prejudice compared to the no-intervention
alternative. Thus interventions designed to educate individuals
in an effort to encourage buy-in at a personal level and appeal
to these personal egalitarian standards are more likely to reduce
expressions of prejudice and avoid harmful backfire effects than
programs in which authorities force individuals to comply with
external anti-prejudice standards.
In addition, the effectiveness of an educational intervention
can depend on the ideology underlying the approach. The tra-
ditional institutional approach to racial fairness, referred to in
relevant literature as the color-
blindness approach, explicitly
directs individuals to ignore race
and other differences. This popular
colorblindness strategy underlies
the mandate that judicial decision
makers disregard extralegal factors
like race and gender when weigh-
ing the evidence. Given the
mounting evidence that messages
using intrinsic appeals are more
effective at reducing prejudice than messages conveying an
external pressure to comply, the colorblindness approach is not
an optimal bias-reduction strategy. This approach has been
shown to generate greater individual expressions of racial bias
on both explicit and implicit measures compared to a multicul-
turalism approach that promotes the value of diversity and
encourages individuals to appreciate group differences.21 In
addition to other research showing that a colorblindness
approach to reducing expressions of racial prejudice often back-
fires,22 a multiculturalism approach has been shown to improve
the likelihood that a person will accurately detect instances of
racial discrimination when observed, whereas a colorblindness
approach produces a reduced likelihood of detection. This
trend suggests that the colorblindness approach may appear to
work to improve racial fairness but in actuality may result in an
underreporting of incidents of racial discrimination.23
The counterproductive effects of particular strategies in the
promotion of racial fairness can spread beyond individuals in
the immediate educational environment. The mainstream pop-
ularity of the colorblindness approach can prompt white indi-
viduals, in response to implied (but unspoken) social cues to
ignore race, to spontaneously adopt a colorblindness strategy to
avoid the appearance of racial bias when interacting with a
black partner. Strategic demands to ignore race as part of a col-
orblindness approach to reducing racial prejudice can produce
unintentional, “ironic” effects: One study showed that as white
individuals devoted mental resources to the task of ignoring
race, they had fewer resources available to dedicate toward
monitoring and controlling their nonverbal behavior in social
interactions with black partners. As a result of this cognitive
In framing 
an educational
message on
implicit bias, . . .
the appeal used
has important
ramifications.
Court Review - Volume 49 193
Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 800 (2001); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis
M. Rivera, When Social Context Matters: The Influence of Long-Term
Contact and Short-Term Exposure to Admired Outgroup Members on
Implicit Attitudes and Behavioral Intentions, 26 SOC. COGNITION 112
(2008); Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Reducing Automati-
cally Activated Racial Prejudice Through Implicit Evaluative Condi-
tioning, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 421 (2006).
31. Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma & Alison P. Lenton, Imaging Stereo-
types Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental
Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 828 (2001). 
32. Kerry Kawakami et al., Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of
Training in the Negation of Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype
Activation, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 871 (2000).
33. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Mak-
ing: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Delib-
erations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006).
34. Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen¸ Constructed Criteria:
Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 474
(2005); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism &
Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315 (2000).
35. Chadee, supra note 12.
36. Gordon Hodson et al., Aversive Racism in Britain: Legal Decisions
and the Use of Inadmissible Evidence, 35 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 437
(2005); James D. Johnson et al., Justice Is Still Not Colorblind: Dif-
ferential Racial Effects of Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 893 (1995).
24. Apfelbaum et al., supra note 22.
25. See generally John F. Dovidio et al., Why Can We Just Get Along?
Interpersonal Biases and Interracial Distrust, 8 CULTURAL DIVERSITY
& ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 88 (2002); Mark Snyder, Elizabeth
D. Tanke & Ellen Berscheid, Social Perception and Interpersonal
Behavior: On the Self-fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes, 35 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 656 (1977); Mark Chen & John A.
Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes: The Self-
fulfilling Nature of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541 (1997).
26. J. Nicole Shelton & Jennifer Richeson, Intergroup Contact and Plu-
ralistic Ignorance, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91 (2005).
27. Henk Aarts, Peter M. Gollwitzer & Ran R. Hassin, Goal Contagion:
Perceiving Is for Pursuing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 23
(2004); Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Con-
sensus Influences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility,
80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 645 (2001).
28. Lauri A. Rudman et al., “Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Mal-
leability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 856 (2001).
29. See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of
Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751
(2006). 
30. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure
to Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleabil-
ity of Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 642 (2004); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald,
On the Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic
resource strain, white participants
actually exhibited less friendly non-
verbal behavior toward the black part-
ner than was observed when white
participants interacted with a white
partner.24 Other research indicates
that this kind of discriminatory non-
verbal behavior can negatively influ-
ence the subsequent perceptions and
responses of the stigmatized individ-
ual or individuals25 and may hinder
future efforts to engage in interracial interaction.26
Thus, educational initiatives promoting racial fairness
should focus not just on the individual, but also on the climate
of the organization as a whole. When peers and leadership fig-
ures demonstrate behavior consistent with the multiculturalism
approach, these expressions of egalitarian goals and beliefs will
positively influence others in the community.27 Other educa-
tional efforts to change racial attitudes through diversity-train-
ing courses have also helped to at least temporarily reduce indi-
viduals’ expressions of implicit and explicit racial biases.28
CONTACT AND EXPOSURE INTERVENTIONS 
Generally, increased interracial contact seems to have a pos-
itive effect on both implicit and explicit attitudes.29 Exposure to
individuals who contradict prevailing cultural or social stereo-
types can, in particular, reduce the expression of implicit racial
biases. This works when people have an opportunity to see or
interact with stigmatized group members in respected leader-
ship roles or as role models, or otherwise observe them behav-
ing in a manner that contradicts prevailing social stereotypes.30
Simply imagining stigmatized group members in counter-
stereotypic ways can also reduce the expression of implicit
biases.31 Even individuals who engage in extensive practice
mentally countering or negating stereotypes appear to be able
to successfully reduce implicit biases based on those stereo-
types over time.32
More diverse juries tend to produce decisions less biased by
the defendant’s race, presumably because they force jurors to
engage with one another on an equal basis in deliberations and
to expressly confront different conclusions about the trial evi-
dence that were reached based on the jurors’ unique life expe-
riences and attitudes, including implicit biases.33 Although
more research is needed on the precise mechanisms by which
jury diversity affects juror decision making, it appears that the
presence of minorities on a jury not only brings more diverse
perspectives to the table, but it also increases white juror aware-
ness of race-related concerns in a way that stimulates a more
thorough and more factually accurate evaluation and discus-
sion of trial evidence. 
INTERVENTIONS THAT CLARIFY STANDARDS FOR
JUDGMENT
Discrimination tends to emerge more in ambiguous deci-
sion-making contexts than straightforward ones.34 White-
majority juries more often convict and recommend harsher sen-
tences for black defendants than white defendants when the
prosecution presents weak or ambiguous evidence against
them.35 Other studies show that mock jurors are more likely to
discriminate against black defendants than white defendants in
verdict and sentencing decisions when presented with mixed or
incriminating but inadmissible evidence.36 To check for poten-
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tial bias, a decision maker may look to determine if he or she
has reasonable justification for the decision based on legitimate
decision-making factors. However, this research shows that it is
difficult for decision makers to realize when their decisions are
influenced by race, ethnicity, gender, or other extraneous fac-
tors if other selective information can be used to support their
decision. 
People may not be able to identify and correct for bias in
ambiguous contexts because decision-making standards tend to
change to rationalize judgments that are actually influenced by
extraneous factors. In a seminal series of studies, Uhlmann and
Cohen showed that when evaluating male and female job appli-
cants for a gender-stereotypical job (e.g., a stereotypically mas-
culine position as a police chief), people’s perceptions about the
credentials needed to be successful at the job tended to shift
post hoc to justify gendered decision making.37 That is, regard-
less of whether the male had “street smarts” or a strong educa-
tional background, people tended to justify their decision to
select the male candidate over the female candidate by claiming
that whichever credential the male had (but that the female did
not) was more important to the job. Most telling is the fact that
these decision makers thought they were providing an objec-
tive, rational, unbiased decision about the best candidate to
hire. 
If clear decision-making criteria are defined at the outset,
however, the type of “shifting standards” effect that can unin-
tentionally result in discrimination may be eliminated. In a fol-
low-up study by Uhlmann and Cohen, people who committed
to clear priorities about the criteria they would use in making
the police-chief hiring decision showed no evidence of gen-
dered decision making, but people who did not make such a
commitment and relied more on discretionary, selective justifi-
cation made decisions that were biased by gender. This shows
that clarified decision-making standards can reduce stereotyp-
ing and discrimination in outcomes. 
POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF INTERVENTION 
STRATEGIES FOR USE WITH JURIES
Although interventions have shown promise in reducing the
effects of implicit bias on judgment and behavior more gener-
ally, not all of these strategies lend themselves well to practical
application in jury decision making. We discuss some potential
intervention strategies for use with juries below and consider
the feasibility of each. 
EDUCATE JURORS ON IMPLICIT BIAS 
Education or training on the topic of implicit bias has been
provided to judges and court staff in some states.38 However,
even the most conservative of
these educational initiatives
take a significant amount of
time to implement and require
substantial resources and prepa-
ration. To introduce training
during jury selection, courts
would need to have trainers
available to present educational
material to prospective jurors,
the time to implement a semi-
nar that would likely last one to
two hours at minimum due to
the complexity of the subject
matter, and the resources to allow prospective jurors to explore
the topic through feedback or the opportunity for practice.
Moreover, most Americans now live in jurisdictions that
employ a one-day/one-trial term of service.39 This system sub-
stantially reduces the burden of jury service on individual
jurors by distributing it across a much larger pool of prospec-
tive jurors. Courts that have implemented this system necessar-
ily had to abandon the earlier practice of summoning prospec-
tive jurors for an “Orientation Day” and now conduct a brief
juror orientation (typically 20-30 minutes) in the morning
when jurors report and before they are sent to courtrooms for
jury selection. The combination of resources required for an
educational program on implicit bias plus the lack of time in
which to present such a program makes it unlikely that any
court would pursue this intervention option. 
RAISE AWARENESS OF IMPLICIT BIAS WITH IATS OR
RACE-RELEVANT VOIR DIRE QUESTIONING
A number of alternative interventions have been suggested
for use in jury selection, but little is yet known about their effi-
cacy in reducing bias. For example, the administration of IATs to
jurors40 and the addition of race-relevant voir dire questioning41
have been proposed as means of raising juror awareness about
implicit bias and alerting jurors to its potential influence on their
decisions. Although such approaches may help to reduce
expressions of bias, these options are impractical in many courts
for many of the same reasons discussed with regard to the edu-
cational-seminar option above. Costs associated with these tech-
niques (e.g., printing and processing of questionnaires at a time
when states are facing new and significant budgetary challenges)
and limited existing court resources (e.g., computer access for
potential jurors to take the IAT, or trained staff to code and
process a paper-and-pencil version of the test) preclude these
options from consideration in many jurisdictions.
37. Uhlmann & Cohen, supra note 34.
38. See PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS:
RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION (2012); Pamela M. Casey, Roger K.
Warren, Fred L. Cheesman, & Jennifer K. Elek, Addressing Implicit
Bias in the Courts, 49 CT. REV. 64 (2013).
39. GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS,
THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A
COMPENDIUM REPORT (2007). Under a one-day/one-trial term of
service, prospective jurors report to the courthouse on the sum-
mons date. If a juror is sworn as a trial juror or alternate, he or she
serves for that trial and is released from further service at the com-
pletion of the trial. If a juror is not selected as a trial juror or alter-
nate, he or she is released at the end of the reporting day.
40. Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of
Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827 (2012).
41. Regina A. Schuller, Veronica Kazoleas & Kerry Kawakami, The
Impact of Prejudice Screening Procedures on Racial Bias in the Court-
room, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 320 (2009); Sommers, supra note 33.
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(2011).
45. Samuel R. Sommers, Determinants and Consequences of Jury Racial
Diversity: Empirical Findings, Implications, and Directions for
Future Research, 2 SOC. ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 65 (2008).
46. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, Beth Murphy & John B.
Meixner, Damage Anchors on Real Juries (Sept 20, 2011) available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883861 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.188386. 
47. See, e.g., EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY (2010); COUNCIL FOR
COURT EXCELLENCE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JURY PROJECT, JURIES FOR
THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND: PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYS-
TEMS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 19-37 (1998); Kenneth J. Melilli, Bat-
son in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremp-
tory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1996).
48. See, e.g., JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas Munsterman, Paula L.
Hannaford-Agor & G. Marc Whitehead eds., 2d ed. 2006).
The National Center for State
Courts’ State-of-the-States Sur-
vey of Jury System Improvement
Efforts further illustrates the lim-
ited viability of debiasing inter-
ventions during voir dire.42 In
nearly 12,000 jury trials, judges
and lawyers reported that they
spent two hours on average to
select a jury, a task that also
involves confirming jurors’ qual-
ifications and ability to serve for
the length of the trial and inves-
tigating each juror’s ability to be
fair and impartial if selected as a
trial juror. Most judges and lawyers would not embrace new
debiasing interventions during voir dire due to the additional
time involved. States also vary in the extent to which voir dire
is judge-dominated or attorney-dominated, but in either case,
voir dire is perhaps the most individualistic stage of the trial.
Judges have a great deal of discretion in how they conduct voir
dire and are protective of that discretion as a matter of judicial
independence. In a judge-dominated voir dire state, the likeli-
hood of training the entire trial bench on how to use debiasing
interventions effectively in all cases, and then ensuring that
they actually apply that training, is very remote. Doing so in a
lawyer-dominated voir dire state is even more remote given the
complete absence of a unified bar. For consistent use in the
majority of state courts, a realistic practical remedy for implicit
bias in juror decision making must be not only effective but also
expedient and economical.
ASSEMBLE DIVERSE JURIES
Convention assumes that deliberations among a demo-
graphically diverse group of jurors are more likely to facilitate a
thorough and fair evaluation of the evidence because different
perspectives are presumed to be represented in the discussion.
Moreover, as indicated above, research shows that when white
jurors expect to engage with a diverse jury, they tend to
approach deliberations in a way that promotes a more thorough
and factually accurate evaluation of the evidence.43
It is not always possible, however, to ensure a racially diverse
jury. This may be of particular concern in jurisdictions with rel-
atively homogeneous jury pools, which comprise the great
majority of state courts. For example, the jury-eligible popula-
tion of black/African-Americans comprises less than 10 percent
of the total jury-eligible population in more than three-quarters
of counties in the United States. Those counties encompass
more than half of the total U.S. population.44 Unfortunately,
even in more diverse communities, jury panels often fail to fully
reflect community demographic characteristics due to non-sys-
tematic exclusion of minorities from jury pools,45 reductions in
the size of trial juries,46 and the pervasive discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.47
STRENGTHEN THE JURY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
The past two decades have seen a dramatic change in judges’
management of jury trials. The traditional view that juror
impartiality is best served when jurors maintain a strictly pas-
sive role has gradually given way to the view that jurors are
active learners and perform best when given commonplace
decision-making tools to better understand and remember trial
evidence. These tools include permitting jurors to take notes,
permitting jurors to submit written questions to witnesses, per-
mitting jurors to discuss the evidence before final deliberations,
instructing jurors on the basic elements of the law they will be
told to apply before the evidentiary portion of the trial, and pro-
viding jurors with written copies of jury instructions.48 Evalua-
tions of each of these innovations have shown that they are
effective decision-making aids in terms of improved compre-
hension of the evidence and law and increased retention of evi-
dence presented at trial. By emphasizing the importance of
juror comprehension of the evidence and law, these types of
tools provide jurors with a stronger framework for decision
making and lead to greater clarity about the basis for their col-
lective verdict, which theoretically should reduce the potential
for implicit bias to skew the verdict. No research has been con-
ducted to explicitly examine the relationship between these
jury-trial innovations and implicit bias. Although there is some
reason to believe these tools may be helpful for this purpose, it
is premature to conclude that these innovations will reduce the
impact of implicit bias on jury verdicts. The potential efficacy
of these tools as debiasing agents must be examined and
demonstrated empirically, through rigorous scientific research,
before courts are encouraged to use them as implicit-bias inter-
ventions. 
USE SPECIALIZED JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON IMPLICIT
BIAS
Historically, courts have relied extensively on jury instruc-
tions to guide juror decision making because this approach is
relatively inexpensive, expedient, and easy to administer to
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196 Court Review - Volume 49 
49. Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy  & Mary R. Rose, The “Ket-
tleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and
Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (2012); see REID HASTIE,
STEVEN PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983).
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each new jury. However, research studies have provided mixed
evidence of its utility in practice. On one hand, most studies
confirm that jurors take their responsibility to apply the law
provided by the trial judge seriously, spending up to one-quar-
ter of their deliberation time focused on jury instructions.49 On
the other hand, although most jurors in actual trials report that
they understand the law relatively well,50 research shows that
jurors have fairly low levels of comprehension regarding the
basic legal principles articulated in jury instructions.51 But
when Diamond and her colleagues observed actual jury delib-
erations in 50 civil trials, they found that nearly 80% of the
jurors’ comments about the instructions were accurate and
nearly half of the incorrect comments were ultimately corrected
during deliberations. This led Diamond and her colleagues to
surmise that jurors in actual trials might be “able to assist one
another in ways not captured on post-deliberation questions or
in studies of individual respondents.”52 The implication from
this research is that to understand the full impact that any jury
instruction (including a specialized implicit-bias jury instruc-
tion) may have on juror decision making, one should examine
it in a context in which group deliberations take place. 
It is not yet known whether a well-crafted jury instruction
could help to mitigate the effect of implicit racial bias in juror
decision making. Studies show that individuals can control the
behavioral expression of implicit biases in specific laboratory
contexts if provided with a concrete strategy for bias reduc-
tion.53 In addition, whether or not jurors are motivated to pro-
duce a fair and just outcome can determine whether debiasing
instructions are followed. However, pattern jury instructions
developed for use in state and federal jury trials rarely incorpo-
rate these characteristics, relying instead on the simple admo-
nition that jurors should not let “bias, sympathy, prejudice, or
public opinion influence your decision.”54 Moreover, jury
instructions tend to be written in an authoritarian legal style
that, in the context of implicit
bias, may ultimately prove coun-
terproductive by triggering a
backlash effect.55
CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that members of the
court community are coming to
understand the general problem
posed by implicit bias and are
clamoring for readily available
solutions on which they can act.
As the court community has
become more knowledgeable
about implicit bias and more
aware of the potential for harm in judicial decision making,
judges and lawyers have expressed a great deal of interest in
extending intervention efforts to jurors through the develop-
ment of a specialized jury instruction on implicit bias. Judge
Mark Bennett of the U.S. District Court, Northern District of
Iowa, was the first trial judge known to have incorporated this
approach in jury trials.56 More recently, the Criminal Justice
Section of the American Bar Association has convened a com-
mittee to develop a toolbox of options intended to reduce the
impact of implicit bias in court proceedings, including a jury
instruction on implicit bias.57 The topic of implicit-bias instruc-
tions has also been a recurring theme on listserv discussions
among members of pattern jury instruction committees.58
Through these efforts and others, several versions of implicit-
bias jury instructions are now or will soon be available for use. 
Unfortunately, existing research suggests the possibility that
an implicit-bias jury instruction may produce a backlash effect
that actually exacerbates expressions of both implicit and
explicit bias. This effect may not be universal: Specialized
It is not yet
known whether
a well-crafted
jury instruction
could help to 
mitigate the
effect of implicit
racial bias in
juror decision
making.
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implicit-bias jury instructions may successfully reduce expres-
sions of bias with some types of jurors but elicit backlash from
others. Consequently, to prevent the dissemination of harmful
jury instructions that produce backlash effects, we strongly rec-
ommend that new jury instructions be carefully evaluated using
rigorous empirical methods to determine their overall and dif-
ferential effectiveness before they are broadly promoted for use
in the courtroom. 
To begin this process, the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) is currently engaged in an effort to test the efficacy of
an implicit-bias jury instruction. With funding from the State
Justice Institute,59 the NCSC has undertaken a project to draft
a model jury instruction on implicit bias and, using mock-jury
methods with a vignette of a fictitious trial, to pilot test the
instruction to determine its effectiveness in minimizing the
impact of implicit bias in juror decision making. The results of
the pilot study, which should be available in late 2013, will help
inform the direction of future efforts to address implicit bias in
jury trials.
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1. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007).
2. REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES: ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT 4 (2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/mcjc_2007.authcheckdam.pdf.
3. Id. at 5.
4. MODEL CODE, supra note 1, at R. 3.6, cmt. 2.
5. THE BAR ASSOC. OF SAN FRANCISCO EQUALITY COMM. REPORT ON LES-
BIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER ISSUES 1 (2007),
http://www.sfbar.org/forms/diversity/lgbt_report_nov07_basf.pdf.
6. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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In 2007, the American Bar Association (ABA) updated theModel Code of Judicial Conduct (the “Code”) to include theterm “domestic partner,” which it defined as “a person with
whom another person maintains a household and an intimate
relationship, other than a person to whom he or she is legally
married.”1 The ABA asserted the importance of adding
“domestic partner” to the Code was that “commonplace ‘non-
traditional’ relationships that exist outside marriage are deserv-
ing of treatment equal to that afforded marital relationships in
evaluating their potential conflict-of-interest implications.”2
This update recognized “the fact that it is desirable to have a
uniform system of ethical principles that applies to all individ-
uals serving a judicial function.”3
Many states have amended their Codes of Judicial Conduct
(CJCs) to include the term “domestic partner.” But the term
“domestic partner” is often associated with same-sex relation-
ships and is, for certain purposes, defined to exclude other
types of relationships. This paper will argue that some of the
states that have chosen not to include the term “domestic part-
ner” in their CJC likely did so as a result of this term’s associ-
ation with lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
advocacy. States that have a history of resisting the advance-
ment of LGBT equality have consistently chosen not to include
the term “domestic partner” in their CJC, perhaps to avoid the
appearance of support for LGBT equality. The exclusion of the
term “domestic partner” in these states’ CJCs reflects a partisan
stance and is based on an incomplete understanding of the
benefits gained by including the term in a CJC. This paper will
also acknowledge and discuss why some states chose not to
include the term “domestic partner” in their CJCs, despite a
history of support for LGBT equality. Further, this paper will
argue that the ABA’s introduction of the term “domestic part-
ner” in the 2007 Code is an intelligent and effective promotion
of judicial integrity, which should be adopted by all states,
notwithstanding their stance on LGBT issues.
I. “DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS” REFER TO MANY 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS, BUT THE 
TERM HAS BEEN WIDELY USED TO PROMOTE LGBT
EQUALITY.
A plain reading of the ABA’s definition of “domestic partner”
includes unmarried heterosexual and same-sex couples whose
relationships are comparable to those of lawfully married cou-
ples, but who are not married. This definition of “domestic
partner” is open enough to potentially include polyamorous or
polygamous intimate relationships. The ABA’s definition could
also refer to a close, platonic relationship between people who
live together, since the Code’s use of the term ‘intimate’ sug-
gests that sexual relations are not an inherent prerequisite.4
Yet, the term “domestic partner” has been used extensively
by LGBT advocates, including advocates in the legal profes-
sion. In November 2007, for example, the Bar Association for
San Francisco issued a report on the best practices for employ-
ers to use to promote LGBT equality and inclusion within their
workforce.5 For example, the report urged employers to create
an LGBT-inclusive culture through the use of affirming lan-
guage, specifically by using marriage-neutral terms.6 Specifi-
cally, the report explained:
An LGBT attorney who is in a committed relationship
appreciates having his or her employer show respect for
that relationship. When the law office issues an invita-
tion to a business function to employees and their
“spouses” without also including non-marriage specific
terminology, the company fails to signal that respect.
Outside of [the few states that allow same-sex marriage],
“spouse” means opposite-sex husband or wife. Using the
term in invitations suggests to LGBT employees that they
are invisible to the employer, or that the employer does
not respect their relationships. . . . This small change in
wording can have a big impact on firm culture.7
The term “domestic partner” within the report referred
exclusively to same-sex couples.8
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franchising/best_practices.authcheckdam.pdf.
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Further, the ABA Commission on Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity  released a report in 2011 echoing the Bar of
San Francisco’s 2007 recommendations, though the ABA has
not yet adopted the recommendations.9 In almost identical lan-
guage, the ABA Commission’s report encouraged employers to
“[e]nsure that social invitations are inclusive by using wording
that invites partners, not just spouses,” while defining “domes-
tic partnerships” as same-sex partnerships. Thus, LGBT advo-
cates frequently use the term “domestic partner” to refer exclu-
sively to same-sex couples and to promote LGBT equality.
Likewise, some states have used the term “domestic part-
ner” to refer exclusively to same-sex couples. Instead of the
ABA’s broad, open-ended definition of “domestic partner,” Cal-
ifornia explicitly defined “domestic partnership” by statute as
a same-sex relationship.10 California’s Code of Judicial Ethics
uses the term “registered domestic partner” to denote a person
who has registered for a domestic partnership pursuant to state
law or who is recognized as a domestic partner pursuant to the
California Family Code.11 In California, only same-sex couples
can apply for domestic-partnership status, though there is a
narrow exception for unmarried heterosexual couples over 62
years of age.12 In California, a “registered domestic partner-
ship” is a legally recognized relationship that has the same
specificity and determinability as a heterosexual marriage.
Although the ABA could have Code defined “domestic part-
ner” to refer only to same-sex relationships, it specifically
opted not to do so despite the existence of exclusively LGBT
definitions, such as California’s. This is especially true in light
of the fact that the ABA’s past advocacy for same-sex marriage
and LGBT adoption rights is documented. 
However, the use of the term “domestic partner” in the
Code’s 2007 revisions arguably did not represent similar advo-
cacy. Since California and even the ABA’s Commission report
define “domestic partner” as referring only to same-sex cou-
ples, the ABA would have explicitly defined a “domestic part-
ner” as a member of a same-sex couple if the purpose of
including this term was LGBT advocacy. Instead, the inclusion
of the term “domestic partner” in the Code practically and
intelligently holds all judges to the same level of accountabil-
ity, regardless of their relationship status or sexual orientation. 
II. THE INCLUSION OF “DOMESTIC PARTNER” IN THE
2007 CODE EFFECTIVELY PROMOTES JUDICIAL
INTEGRITY
The Code’s standard for when a judge must recuse herself or
himself is the most stringent when the case regards the judge’s
spouse or domestic partner because it not only requires recusal
from a case involving a spouse or domestic partner’s interest,
but also from cases which involve the interest of the spouse or
domestic partner’s close relatives. This standard is in recogni-
tion of the greater importance a spouse or domestic partner’s
family may play in a judge’s life when compared to the role of
the family of an acquaintance or roommate. Thus, the Code
instructs judges to recuse themselves in cases where a person
within the third degree of relationship to the judge, the judge’s
spouse, or the judge’s domestic partner has more than a de min-
imis interest in the proceeding, which could be substantially
impacted by the proceeding’s outcome.13
The Code also requires judicial recusal when the judge, the
judge’s spouse, domestic partner, parent, child, or any member
of the judge’s family residing in the judge’s household has an
economic interest in the subject matter.14 Thus, the Code
expands the grounds for recusal by requiring a judge to with-
draw from a case where the judge’s domestic partner, spouse, or
a close family member of either has an interest in the case. The
ABA explains that the addition of “domestic partner” in Rule
2.11 will require domestic partners and spouses to be treated
comparably for purposes of evaluating economic conflicts.15
The ABA’s 2007 Code appropriately uses “spouse” and
“domestic partner” for judicial recusal purposes, as domestic
partners influence judges as much as spouses. Since spouses
usually play a more important role in a judge’s life than any
other person, the Code requires a judge’s recusal for conflicts
arising from the judge’s relationship to the spouse and the
spouse’s relatives. Of course, if any other person occupies a
role in the judge’s life comparable to that of a spouse, then the
judicial code should have the same recusal requirements. 
Absent the term “domestic partner,” a judicial ethics code
could inappropriately fail to mandate a judge’s recusal in cases
involving a cohabitating heterosexual partner or a same-sex
partner and for people within three degrees of these partners
simply because the person is not a “spouse” but rather a “room-
mate.” If someone with an interest in a case is three familial
degrees close to a judge’s roommate, the judge need not recuse
herself. A domestic partner should be treated equally to a
spouse for purposes of recusal because such a partner could
easily influence a judge as much as a spouse and could have
more influence over a judge than an estranged, but still lawfully
married, spouse. Now that the 2007 Code requires recusal
when someone within three degrees of relationship of a judge’s
spouse or a judge’s domestic partner has an interest in a pro-
ceeding, the integrity of the judiciary is improved.16 In fact, the
ABA’s use of “domestic partner” in Rules 2.11 of the Code
strategically and practically promotes judicial integrity.
III. MOST LGBT-FRIENDLY STATES INCLUDED 
“DOMESTIC PARTNER” IN THEIR CJCS  
Most states do not specify the sexual orientation of a
“domestic partner,” preferring instead to use the Code’s broad
definition that is sexuality neutral. Arizona, California, New
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Mexico, Hawaii, Delaware, Connecticut, Maryland, Iowa, New
Hampshire, Washington, Nevada, Wyoming, Kansas, Montana,
Indiana, Utah, Colorado, North Dakota, Nebraska, Tennessee,
and Arkansas included the term “domestic partner” in their
CJCs.17 Iowa, New Hampshire, and Connecticut had all legal-
ized same-sex marriage before the revision of their CJCs to
include the term “domestic partner.” For these three states,
the term “domestic partner” in their CJCs presumably refers to
a person involved in a nonmarital, committed relationship, but
not necessarily to a member of a same-sex couple. 
Connecticut’s Code of Judicial Conduct arguably promoted
LGBT rights by defining “spouse” as a person to whom one is
“legally married or joined in a civil union.”18 Likewise, in New
Hampshire’s code, the definition of “domestic partner”
includes parties who have entered into a civil union.19 New
Hampshire’s Rules of Professional Conduct instruct lawyers
that unmarried same-sex or opposite-sex partners “may be at
least as important as blood or marital relationships.”20
States that have included “civil union” or “domestic partner”
in their CJCs probably did so to recognize that committed rela-
tionships that could improperly influence judges can occur out-
side of legal marriages. Two of the three states that legalized
same-sex marriage before revising their CJCs recognized a part-
ner through a “civil union” as the legal equivalent of “spouse”
or “domestic partner,” consistent with their history of support
for LGBT equality. States with LGBT-friendly public policies
who included “domestic partner” in their CJCs, probably did so
to ensure that all forms of loving relationships are considered
when determining whether a potential conflict exists.
IV. MOST STATES THAT EXCLUDED THE TERM 
“DOMESTIC PARTNER” FROM THEIR CODES HAVE 
A HISTORY OF ANTI-LGBT POLICIES,  BUT SHOULD
STILL INCLUDE “DOMESTIC PARTNER” IN THEIR
CODES DESPITE THAT HISTORY.
Many of the states that rejected the term “domestic partner”
from their CJCs have a demonstrated history of opposing
LGBT equality. Their choice to exclude this term is consistent
with that history and in most cases probably dictated this
choice.  For example, South Dakota, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Missouri, Minnesota, and Maine did not amend their CJCs to
include the term “domestic partner.”21 In South Dakota, no
provision forbids judges from discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation.22 Similarly, Missouri declined to introduce
“domestic partner” into its revised CJC, but also did not
require a judge’s recusal on cases involving the judge’s spouse’s
family.23 South Dakota, Mississippi, and Oklahoma have no
laws that specifically address hate crimes on the basis of sexual
orientation.24 South Dakota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Mis-
souri all also constitutionally prohibit same-sex marriage.25
Additionally, South Dakota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Mis-
souri do not protect LGBT youth in schools, do not prevent
sexual orientation discrimination in housing, disallow hospital
visitation, and allow employers to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation.26 In sum, most states that did not include
the term “domestic partner” in their CJCs had policies in
opposition to LGBT rights. 
There are, however. exceptions to the rule that states with
anti-LGBT policies did not include the term “domestic part-
ner” and states with pro-LGBT policies did. Take Minnesota
and Maine. Although Minnesota and Maine both had laws pro-
hibiting same-sex marriage when they decided to exclude
“domestic partner” from their respective CJCs, both states had
pro-LGBT public policies. The omission of “domestic partner”
in Maine’s and Minnesota’s codes of judicial conduct does not
seem to reflect a state policy of opposition to equal rights for
LGBT people. Indeed, Minnesota has since passed legislation
allowing same-sex marriage, allows same-sex-couple adoption,
and joint and second-parent adoption in some jurisdictions,
and recognizes the rights of same-sex couples to visit one
another in the hospital.27 Likewise, Maine provides for some
spousal rights and for hospital visitation for same-sex couples,
while allowing joint and second-parent adoption for same-sex
couples.28 Although Minnesota’s and Maine’s CJCs left out the
term “domestic partner,” these states do not have a history of
opposing LGBT equality. Yet, the absence of “domestic part-
ner” terminology in their CJCs is easily explained.
In fact, Minnesota rejected the term “domestic partner” and
chose an even more expansive conflict-of-interest recusal
requirement for judges in its state CJC. Minnesota’s Commit-
tee for Judicial Ethics decided that a need for recusal arises out
of a judge’s “intimate relationship” with any person.29 The
committee chose to avoid the term “domestic partner” in favor
of a descriptive phrase.30 Instead of “domestic partner,” the
committee used the phrase “a person with whom the judge has
an intimate relationship” for determining when judges should
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite the LGBT rights movement’s use of “domestic part-
ner” and the ABA’s history of support for LGBT equality, the
ABA emphasized the improvement of America’s judicial
integrity as their reason for inserting “domestic partner” in the
2007 Code. The definition of “domestic partner” in the 2007
Code encompasses heterosexual relationships, but the com-
mon usage of the term “domestic partner”  connotes advocacy
for LGBT people, as demonstrated by the California Family
Code and the Bar Association of San Francisco’s report. How-
ever, even acknowledging the ABA’s LGBT-friendly history, the
ABA acted in the public good to create an appropriate regime
for determining judicial conflicts in the 2007 Code and did not
act only to promote LGBT equality.
Aside from Maine and Minnesota, a state’s policy toward
LGBT rights generally determined its choice to include
“domestic partner” in its CJC, with anti-LGBT states rejecting
the term, even though using “domestic partner” would have
been in their best interest. The Statue of Liberty, perhaps the
most iconic American symbol, clearly preaches inclusion:
“[G]ive me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearn-
ing to breathe free.”36 Echoing the Statue of Liberty’s gospel, let
us applaud the ABA’s practical, integrity-driven policy, which
acknowledges that LGBT people serve in the U.S. judiciary and
makes appropriate provisions to deal with this reality. 
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recuse themselves.31 The Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct
defined “intimate relationship” as “a continuing relationship
involving sexual relations as defined in Rule 1.8(j)(1) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.”32  Although excluding
“domestic partner” from Minnesota’s CJC, the committee sub-
stituted a phrase that is equally protective of judicial integrity
and in keeping with their pro-LGBT policies.
Maine likewise protected judicial integrity and LGBT equal-
ity despite not using the term “domestic partner.” Maine
amended its CJC in June 2009, but excluded the term “domes-
tic partner.”33 However, Maine’s 2009 CJC created a more
expansive definition of family by requiring a judge to be
recused when the case involves “a person with whom the judge
maintains a close personal relationship.”34 This definition of
family conceivably includes same-sex and opposite-sex part-
ners and therefore protects integrity like the term “domestic
partnership.” But at least one recommendation was made in
favor of adopting the term “domestic partner” as part of any
possible amendments to Maine’s CJC.35 Although Maine
decided to reject the term “domestic partner” from the state’s
CJC, the omission of “domestic partner” does not seem to
reflect an anti-LGBT state policy. Still, these states are the
exception, not the rule. 
Although anti-LGBT states may have sought to make their
CJCs consistent with their policy regarding sexual orientation,
their choice to exclude the term “domestic partner” in their
CJCs fails to protect the public from potential and actual con-
flicts. For example, although Missouri’s CJC did not include
“domestic partner” terminology, Missouri has no recusal
requirement for a judge’s heterosexual spouse’s relations and
therefore creates an equality of treatment, but less protection
for the public from judicial conflicts of interest. Missouri’s CJC
requires recusal only if a spouse or a person living with a judge
has an interest in a case before that judge. Because the ABA
probably did not include “domestic partner” within the Code’s
terminology only to champion LGBT rights, but also to
improve judicial integrity, a state’s anti-LGBT policies should
not impact the inclusion of the term “domestic partner” into
their judicial ethics codes.
Without equal and codified recusal requirements for judges’
domestic partners, judicial integrity is at risk, and  LGBT
judges risk becoming targets of ethics complaints despite full
compliance with existing state rules. To promote justice, effi-
ciency, and public confidence in state judicial systems, even
states with a history of opposing LGBT equality should include
“domestic partner” in their CJCs.
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American Judges Association, 
Effective Adjudication of Domestic-
Abuse Cases (A Web-Based Training
Program for Judges)
http://education.amjudges.org 
The American Judges Association is
launching a web-based, comprehensive
training program for judges regarding the
handling of domestic-violence cases. The
program includes presentations by lead-
ing experts in the area, with separate
modules on:
• The dynamics of domestic violence,
• Civil-protection orders,
• Child-custody cases,
• Evidentiary issues, and 
• Sentencing. 
Each module has clearly identified
learning objectives, video scenarios and
presentations, interactive exercises to
check comprehension of key points, and
resources to explore for further informa-
tion. There are courtroom-based scenar-
ios, dynamic panel discussions, and addi-
tional interactive content. The program
should be of interest both to new and
experienced judges; the program truly
features outstanding experts that judges
otherwise might not have the time,
opportunity, or funding to be able to hear.
The program was developed with
grant assistance from the Bureau of Jus-
tice Assistance, plus help from Futures
Without Violence and the National Cen-
ter for State Courts. This program has
been a major project of AJA for the past
two years, and we believe this web-based
curriculum is the best educational prod-
uct ever put together for judges on
domestic violence. Short of attending an
intensive, three- to five-day training pro-
gram, nothing like this has ever been put
together. And it’s totally free to you and
your colleagues.
The program was nearing release as
we went to press—check the website
address above to see whether it’s now up
and running. You’ll either find access to
the full program or a notice that it will be
coming shortly. Please check it out, and
let other judges know of this great
resource provided by the American
Judges Association.
SPEAKERS
JUDICIAL AMBASSADORS: An 
Outreach Program of the American 
Psychological Association’s Committee
on Legal Issues
http://www.goo.gl/OpAZyE 
As part of an ongoing effort to build
and maintain effective relationships
between the psychological and judicial
communities, the American Psychologi-
cal Association (APA) Committee on
Legal Issues maintains an outreach pro-
gram called Judicial Ambassadors.  The
Judicial Ambassadors program seeks to
bring psychologists and court profession-
als together in a variety of contexts to
facilitate the following goals:
• To make psychological research more
accessible to and useful for courts and
judges;
• To work with court officials to develop
collaborative research and continuing
education programs;
• To increase psychologists’ understand-
ing of court operations and legal prac-
tice; 
• To improve psychological research
about legal issues; and
• To facilitate courts’ ability to apply
psychological theories and models in
court-related research.
Judicial Ambassadors are drawn from
APA’s membership (which includes more
than 125,000 psychologists) based on
their scientific expertise in the subjects of
interest to the court.  The Judicial
Ambassadors program also has funding
to help make experts available to inter-
ested judicial organizations for a variety
of purposes, including designing and
implementing educational programs and
workshops, assisting courts with techni-
cal projects or program evaluations, and
participating in advisory committees.
For more information about the Judi-
cial Ambassadors Program, you can con-
tact Donna Beavers, Office of General
Counsel, American Psychological Associ-
ation, 750 First Street, NE, Washington,
DC 20002, email: dbeavers@apa.org. 
A
NEW PUBLICATIONS
Conference of State Court 
Administrators, 2012-2013 Policy
Paper: Evidence-Based Pretrial
Release
http://goo.gl/pk0Wxm 
The Conference of State Court Admin-
istrators (COSCA) has issued its 2012-
2013 policy paper, which urges greater
use of evidence-based assessments of pre-
trial risk of flight and threat to public
safety. COSCA has approved white papers
on about an annual basis for the past 15
years, highlighting topics believed to be
of general interest throughout the United
States.
According to the paper, the United
States in 2010 had the world’s highest
total number of pretrial detainees, and
pretrial detention has costs for both the
public and for detainees. The paper sug-
gests that the use of a validated pretrial-
risk-assessment tool fits well within an
otherwise effective case-management sys-
tem. The report concludes with several
recommendations, including collabora-
tion between state-court leaders and oth-
ers (including law enforcement and
experts) to support risk-based release
decisions of those arrested, reduced
reliance on offense-based bail schedules,
and the increased collection and use of
data. The Conference of Chief Justices
(CCJ) endorsed this COSCA policy paper
in a CCJ resolution that separately urges
reduced reliance on bail schedules and
increased use of evidence-based risk
assessments.
The Resource Page
g
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